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Essays on Nonlinearities and Structural Breaks in the Relationships between
Macroeconomic Variables
by
Irina Blagoja Panovska
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013
Professor Werner Ploberger, Co-Chair
Professor James Morley, Co-Chair
The dissertation is set out in three chapters, focusing on the structural changes that led
to jobless recoveries in following the past three recessions, the asymmetric effects of fiscal
stimulus over the business cycle, and the asymmetric effects of fiscal cuts and stimulus
respectively. In the first chapter, I examine the three leading theoretical explanations for
the recent jobless recoveries using a correlated unobserved components model of aggregate
data for output, sales, employment, and hours. The main finding is that employment
now respond to demand shocks in a way that is consistent with just-in-time utilization of
labor resources. The second and the third chapter focus on asymmetric responses to fiscal
policy. In the second chapter, I investigate the effects of government spending on U.S.
economic activity using a threshold version of a structural vector autoregressive model.
The empirical findings support state-dependent effects of fiscal policy. In particular,
the effects of a government spending shock on output are significantly larger and more
persistent when the economy has a high degree of underutilized resources than when the
economy is close to capacity. The third chapter examines whether there are sign and size
asymmetries in the responses of output, output components, and employment to fiscal
policy. When the economy is not constrained, a large fiscal stimulus is more effective at
increasing employment and output, and cuts have larger effects than increases.
x
Introduction
The following three chapters focus on the structural changes that led to the jobless re-
coveries following the past three recessions, the asymmetric effects of fiscal stimulus over
the business cycle, and the asymmetric effects of fiscal cuts and stimulus respectively. In
each chapter, empirical time series methods are used both to extend and challenge the
existing empirical literature and to evaluate the importance of different channels implied
suggested by theoretical models for the cause of the structural breaks and nonlinearities.
In the first chapter, I examine the relative importance of the channels suggested by
theory for the changes in the behavior of employment during each recovery. There are
three leading explanations for the recent jobless recoveries: increasing importance of
permanent shocks; long expansions creating greater need for restructuring; and structural
changes that cause a shift towards adjusting labor inputs more at the intensive margin
(hours) rather than the extensive margin (employment). This chapter considers these
competing explanations using a correlated unobserved components model of aggregate
data for output, sales, employment, and hours. The main finding is that there is little
empirical support for the first two hypotheses; however, hours and employment now
respond to demand shocks in a way that is more consistent with just-in-time utilization
of labor resources.
The second and the third chapter focus on asymmetric responses to fiscal policy and
are based on joint work with Steven Fazzari and James Morley (Fazzari, Morley, and
Panovska, 2013a, and Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska, 2013b). In the chapters that are
based on joint projects, I developed the empirical model to test the theoretical implica-
tions, collected the data,wrote and ran the code necessary to conduct estimation, and
reported and interpreted the results under the supervision of my co-authors.
In the second chapter, I investigate the effects of government spending on U.S. economic
activity using a threshold version of a structural vector autoregressive model, and examine
if they vary over the business cycle. The empirical findings support state-dependent
effects of fiscal policy. In particular, the effects of a government spending shock on
output are significantly larger and more persistent when the economy has a high degree
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of underutilized resources than when the economy is close to capacity. This evidence is
consistent with an underlying structure of the economy in which insufficient aggregate
demand often constrains the level of economic activity.
In the third chapter, I build on the second chapter, and examine if there is evidence
in favor of sign and size asymmetry within a state. In order to evaluate the degree of
size and sign asymmetry, I use formal impulse response comparison. The main questions
addressed in the second and third chapter are closely related, but distinct, especially when
it comes to designing fiscal policy. The main question addressed in the second chapter is
related to whether there is any evidence in favor of implementing a stimulus or austerity
measures at all, and if the impact of these stimulus measures varies depending on the level
of capacity utilization. If there is evidence in favor of state-dependence indicating that
spending multipliers, on average, are larger during periods of slack, then one could make
a case for using fiscal stimulus to increase output in times of recession or, in general, in
times when the economy is below full capacity. The third chapter focuses on size and sign
asymmetry conditional on the existence of state-dependent responses. If there is evidence
in favor of size and sign asymmetry within a state, this can help us determine the optimal
size and timing for a stimulus and the optimal time and size for an austerity measure.
For example, if there is evidence that a larger stimulus is more effective, dollar-for-dollar,
than a small stimulus in times of recession, then it would be optimal to implement a
single large stimulus package rather sequence of smaller measures. Similarly, if there is
evidence that austerity measures have much smaller negative impact on output during
robust recoveries than during weak recoveries, then there would be an optimal time to
implement austerity measures.
The main findings of the third chapter are that there is strong evidence in favor of
sign and size asymmetry. When the economy is not constrained, a large fiscal stimulus
is more effective at increasing employment and output. On the other hand, when the
economy is close to capacity, a large stimulus has smaller effects on output than a smaller
stimulus. Consumption exhibits the same asymmetric responses as output. A cut crowds
in investment more than an expansion crowds out investment in the constrained state,
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but a large cut has smaller effects than a small cut. Investment is crowded in in the
unconstrained state, but the response is small, and there is no significant evidence of sign
or size asymmetry. When the economy is very close to capacity, fiscal cuts have larger
effects on payroll employment than fiscal expansions. The effects on private employment
are smaller in magnitude, but qualitatively similar to the effects of cuts and expansions
on overall employment.
3
1. Chapter 1: What Explains the Recent Jobless
Recoveries?
1.1. Introduction
The past three recoveries in the United States have been markedly different from most
postwar recoveries prior to 1990 where payroll employment returned to its pre-recession
level just a few months after the trough in output. The typical recovery from earlier reces-
sions was characterized by fast job creation that quickly offset the job losses resulting from
the recession. By contrast, employment growth has been sluggish or negative for months
and even years after the NBER-determined trough in the past three recoveries.Because of
this slow, delayed employment growth, many economists refer to the past three recoveries
as “jobless”. If there is a common explanation for this sluggish employment growth in
recent recoveries, then it might be possible to undertake policies to mitigate the effects
of prolonged joblessness.
While there is consensus in the literature regarding the stylized facts and the change in
the dynamic behavior of employment, there is no consensus on the cause of jobless recov-
eries. In the current literature, there are three leading hypotheses: increasing importance
of permanent movements relative to cyclical movements; organizational restructuring
causing accumulation of inefficiencies during expansions and large restructuring during
recessions; and innovations in labor demand leading to more flexible hiring practices and
just-in-time use of labor resources. Supporting the first hypothesis, Groshen and Potter
(2003) argue that most of the slow growth in employment can be attributed to structural
changes that are related to permanent shifts across industries. Supporting the second hy-
pothesis, Berger (2011) relates the jobless recoveries to the length of expansions preceding
the recessions. During expansions, firms want to fill vacancies quickly and they therefore
choose to hire employees that are not perfectly matched, thus causing employment to rise
above its trend level, creating a significant overhang at the end of a long expansion. A
jobless recovery is simply a return to the long-run trend level. The third hypothesis on
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just-in-time use of labor, first proposed by Schreft and Singh (2003), relates the changes
in the labor market after the 1990s to the switch to just-in-time management of workers.
Since firms now have access to more flexible labor inputs, it became cheaper to absorb the
initial increase in demand during the first stages of a recovery through overtime hours and
flexible labor inputs, rather than through increasing full-time employment. In addition,
productivity-driven changes, compositional changes in labor supply, and particularly ad-
verse demand shocks during recessions and recoveries are also frequently mentioned as
possible explanations for the jobless recoveries.
The main goal of this chapter is to examine the extent to which changes in the re-
lationship between employment, output, sales, and hours can explain the change in the
behavior of employment. I construct an empirical model that nests the three leading
theoretical explanations for jobless recoveries. The model provides strong evidence in fa-
vor of switching to just-in-time utilization of labor resources. A large part of the change
in the behavior of employment since the mid 1980s can be explained by changes in the
adjustment cost of employment relative to hours. Meanwhile, the changes in the behavior
of employment and hours per employee do not arise from a change in the persistence of
sales or other shocks to output.
A lot of the movements in employment can still be explained by cyclical fluctuations. In
particular, recessions and the periods immediately following recessions are characterized
by movements in output and employment that are driven by large transitory shocks.
As discussed in detail below, in contrast with the first two hypotheses, the lackluster
recoveries are not primarily caused by shallow and short recessions; instead, they are
caused by a change in how firms respond to demand shocks. Counterfactual analysis
also suggests that firms wait for signs of a robust recovery in sales before they hire
new employees, and simply increase the number of hours or utilize more flexible labor
resources in the meantime. This is consistent with the predictions of the just-in-time
hypothesis. Results obtained using sectoral data are very similar to the results obtained
using aggregate data, and also provide evidence in favor of a switch towards just-in-time
management of workers.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides some background
about the jobless recoveries. It includes stylized facts about the dynamics of real macroe-
conomic aggregates and labor market variables and the theoretical motivation for the
unobserved components model. The empirical model is presented in Section 1.3. The
results obtained using aggregate data are presented in Section 1.4. The results of the
counterfactual analysis and the variance decomposition of employment are also presented
in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, I investigate the causes of the changing behavior of em-
ployment by comparing the results obtained using aggregate data to the results obtained
using disaggregated data, and I perform robustness checks. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2. Stylized Facts
There is a general consensus in the jobless recovery literature that the changes in the
behavior of employment coincided with the start of the Great Moderation. Figure 1 and
Table 1 present some stylized facts about the behavior of payroll employment and of
macroeconomic aggregates before 1984 and after 1984.
Figure 1 illustrates how different the last three recoveries have been from the typical
postwar recovery prior to 1984. The graph shows the difference in the behavior of payroll
employment for each of the past three recoveries and for the average of the recoveries prior
to 1984 in the three years following the trough.1 The jobless nature of the past three
recoveries is quite clear from the graph. Following the past three recession, the return
to the peak level of employment was slow and sluggish, and employment continued to
decline after the NBER trough, as shown by the downward-sloping paths of employment.
Table 1 shows that there were changes not just in the behavior of employment, but
also in the behavior of output, sales, and hours. These changes in the behavior of both
real variables and labor market variables appear to effect the economy over the entire
business cycle, and not only during recoveries, as evidenced by the first two rows of the
1The two NBER recessions in the early 1980s were treated as a single recession. Treating them as
separate recessions does not affect the results significantly.
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table. The past 28 years were a period of lower volatility and lower growth rates, both
in recoveries and in normal times. The last two columns of the table illustrate the stark
differences between the pre-jobless recoveries period and the period after the mid 1980s.
Recoveries before 1984 were characterized by fast growth in output and sales, a slightly
delayed but large growth in employment and hours, and a decline in hours per current
employee that was mostly due to the rapid increase in the number of employees.2 The
third and the fourth row of Table 1 show that most of the increase in aggregate hours
during the recovery phase in the pre-jobless recoveries period came from increases in
payroll employment. By contrast, both aggregate hours and employment declined, but
average hours per current employee increased in the past three recoveries. In addition to
changes in the behavior of the individual series, there were also changes in the relationship
between the series. The average correlation between employment growth and growth in
hours per employee dropped from 0.72 to 0.28, and the correlation between output per
hour and employment growth dropped from 0.18 to -0.27.
1.3. Theoretical Background
As discussed in the introduction, the theoretical literature about jobless recoveries can
roughly be divided into three main categories. The first strand of the literature emphasizes
the increasing importance of secular trends relative to cyclical movements in employment.
The second strand attributes the jobless recoveries to the long expansions and shallow
recessions, creating employment overhangs either at the beginning or at the end of the
recessions. The third strand of the literature highlights the fact that labor markets
became more flexible since the mid 1980s, and relates these changes to a model in which
firms use a just-in-time approach when it comes to utilizing labor inputs. Alternative
explanations outside the three main strands include productivity driven recoveries, a
shift towards self-employment (postulating that a lot of the slow growth in employment
2Aggregate hours are measured using the updated version of Francis and Ramey’s, 2009 BLS data.
Using alternative measures of hours leads to very similar results.
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following a recession occurs because the official employment numbers do not account for
self-employment), and joblessness that can be attributed entirely to sluggish recoveries
in output.
Theoretical models that focus on the importance of secular movements include the
sectoral shift hypothesis and the job polarization hypothesis; both hypotheses focus on
the fact that reallocation, either across sectors or across occupations, can create tem-
porary inefficiencies leading to slow employment growth. The sectoral shift hypothesis
suggests that jobless recoveries occur due to shifts from one industry to another that
occur primarily during recessions. Groshen and Potter (2003) use the JOLTS database
to examine permanent and temporary layoffs across industries during the 2001 recession
and recovery, and during recessions and recoveries prior to 2001. They look at temporary
versus permanent layoffs, interpreting temporary layoffs as the cyclical component of dis-
employment, and permanent layoffs as the trend component of disemployment. Most of
the new jobs created after the 2001 recession were not due to rehiring workers who were
temporarily laid off, but due to new hires. Based on this definition of trend and cycle in
(dis)employment, they conclude that the slow job creation during the 2001 recovery was
due to structural changes, and that cyclical movements in employment became less im-
portant relative to permanent movements since the mid-1980s. Groshen and Potter offer
sectoral shifts as one of the most plausible explanations for these observed movements in
industry-level employment.
Similarly, Jaimovich and Siu (2012), look at secular trends across occupations, and
relate the jobless recoveries to the increasing job polarization and the shift towards non-
routine based occupations in the United States. Jaimovich and Siu note that a lot of
the losses in the middle of the occupational distribution occur during recessions. They
attribute the jobless recoveries to this hollowing out of the middle of occupational dis-
tribution, which in their model is caused by an increase in the importance of large and
negative permanent shocks. If jobless recoveries are primarily caused by trend movements,
movements in aggregate employment during recessions and recoveries will be caused pri-
marily by permanent shocks; furthermore, compared to the pre-jobless recoveries period,
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permanent movements should be more important for explaining the overall dynamics of
employment relative to cyclical movements.
The second strand of the literature relates the jobless recoveries to changes in the per-
sistence and depth of the business cycle, leading to employment overhang. Koenders and
Rogerson (2005) and Berger (2011) relate the jobless recoveries to the long expansions
preceding the recessions. During expansions, firms can afford to hire employees that are
not perfectly matched, thus causing employment to rise above its trend level, creating a
significant overhang at the end of a long expansion. In this framework, firms use reces-
sions to get rid of the least productive employees, and delay hiring until the restructuring
is completed. A jobless recovery is simply a return to the long-run trend level. Bachmann
(2011) uses a DSGE model in which jobless recoveries also occur due to employment over-
hang, but in this case the overhang occurs at the end of a recession and is caused by short
and shallow recessions. He builds a theoretical model in order to analyze the responses of
employment to cyclical movements in output during the 1991 and 2001 recoveries. In this
type of DSGE model, firms respond to permanent movements by adjusting on the exten-
sive margin, and to transitory movements by adjusting on the intensive margin. In this
framework the jobless recoveries during the 1991 and 2001 recovery occurred because the
recessions appear to be caused by shocks that are less persistent than the shocks causing
the previous recessions. Rather than laying off employees, firms responded by adjusting
hours, creating a large employment overhang at the end of the recession. The slow job
growth during the recovery phase is caused by this overhang at the end of the recession.
It is important to note that the overhang in this model occurs because the 1991 and 2001
recessions were caused by movements that were more shallow and less persistent than the
movements that caused the recessions before 1984. If the jobless recoveries are caused
by employment overhangs, then there should be evidence of employment being above its
long-run trend level either at the start or at the end of the recessions. Furthermore, if the
change in employment is due to shallow and less persistent business cycles, there should
be statistically significant evidence in favor of a change in cyclicality of output.
The just-in-time hypothesis emerged after the 2001 recession, and it postulates that the
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Great Moderation was linked to a switch to just-in-time in inventory management and
use of labor inputs. This hypothesis predicts that firms will adjust along the intensive
margin because the relative cost of adjusting along the extensive margin has increased,
and the relative cost of adjusting along the intensive margin has decreased. Extensive
summary of studies that focus on the 2001 recession is provided in Schreft and Singh
(2003). In a follow-up paper Hodgson et al. (2005) examine the behavior of hours,
overtime, and temporary employment, and conclude that the slow growth of employment
during the 2001 recovery can be explained by switching to just-in-time employment.
Since firms have access to flexible labor inputs like temporary employees, and are able
to increase both overtime hours and aggregate hours much more cheaply than they can
increase employment, they can postpone hiring permanent employees until demand is
robust enough.
Motivated by the changes in the sample statistics, and by the competing theories, I
build an unobserved components model in order to formally examine if the changes in
the relationship between real economic activity and employment are statistically and
economically significant, and if they are consistent with the theoretical models used to
explain the jobless recoveries.
In principle, one could build and solve a theoretical DSGE model that has adjustments
costs along both margins and that incorporates both permanent and cyclical movements
in output. Allowing for a break in the relative adjustment costs and a break in the per-
sistence of the cyclical movements would thus nest all three main hypotheses.3 Unfortu-
nately, as discussed both in Bachmann (2011) and Ramey and Vine (2006) full structural
analysis is quite challenging for models of this type, even for the simple model that has
constant adjustment costs along one margin only, and does not allow any breaks in the
parameters. Instead, the empirical model used in this chapter nests the three competing
hypotheses, and the reduced-form parameters can be related to the parameters from the
3The just-in-time hypothesis corresponds to changes in the adjustment parameters. The structural
reorganization hypothesis corresponds to lower persistence and amplitude of cyclical movements,
especially during recessions, and to employment rising significantly above trend during expansion.
The sectoral shift hypothesis and the job polarization hypothesis corresponds to increasing importance
of permanent movements and adjustments to permanent movements, in particular during recessions.
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structural models.
1.4. Model
In order to examine if there are changes in the relationship between output, sales, and
labor market variables before and after 1984, I adapt the approach used by Morley and
Singh (2012), and consider an unobserved components (UC) model where the innovations
to the permanent component and the transitory innovations are allowed to be correlated,
but the underlying structural shocks driving the model are orthogonal. An unobserved
components model of this type is particularly convenient for analyzing the behavior of
employment, not only because it nests the three competing theories, but also because it
does not entail making the restrictive assumption that all permanent layoffs are due to
structural changes and are made with no intention of ever rehiring workers to fill that
position again.
The empirical model is given by the following equations
yt = τt + cyt (1)
st = τt + cst (2)
et = ζt + cet (3)
ht = µh + cht (4)
where yt is a measure of real output, st is a measure of real final sales, et is a measure
of employment, and ht is a measure of hours per employee. Output and sales have the
same stochastic trend
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τt = µ1 + τt−1 + ηt, (5)
reflecting the fact that output and sales are cointegrated, as discussed in detail in the
Appendix. When looking at y and s in levels, the series y − s is equal to change in
inventories (by definition). Since the model here uses log levels, the difference d can be
interpreted as a close proxy for the change in inventories.
The stochastic trend in employment is the sum of two components: τt and κt, where
ζt = τt + κt (6)
and
κt = µ2 + κt−1 + νt. (7)
The cyclical components are assumed to be stationary, and their dynamics can be
described by the following equations:
Φ1(L)(yt − τt) = λyτηt + λyss + y. (8)
Φ2(L)(st − τt) = λsτηt + s (9)
Φ3(L)(et − τt − κt) = λeτηt + λeyy + λess + e (10)
Φ4(L)(ht − µh) = λhτηt + λhyy + λhss + λhee + h (11)
In this framework, firms can respond to output shocks by adjusting inventories, em-
ployment, and by adjusting hours. The first stochastic component, τt, can be interpreted
as the productivity trend that affects long run output and therefore it affects long run
employment. The second trend component reflects demographic, preference, and exoge-
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nous shocks to the labor share that do not affect the cyclical components of output, sales,
hours, or employment directly. This specification is motivated by the results of Francis
and Ramey (2009) and Kahn and Rich (2009), who show that low-frequency movements
in hours and employment can be explained by two separate factors- productivity and
demand shocks and demographic or taste shifts that are not perfectly correlated with
productivity shocks. The shock ν can also be interpreted as a preference shift as in
Rios-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010). These shocks are allowed to be correlated with
shocks to the productivity trend, but they do not affect the cyclical components of any of
the series directly within a period. Not restricting the correlation between the two trends
to be zero allows demographic changes like aging population or changes in the labor force
to affect output and productivity in the long run, but they have negligible impact on the
cyclical components within a quarter.4
Equations (4) and (11) describe the behavior of hours per employee. The hours per
employee series is stationary across subsamples, which can be easily confirmed by standard
stationarity or unit root tests. In section 1.5, I allow for a stochastic trend in the hours
per employee series (which also accounts for a possible drift in the mean), but the results
are virtually identical to the results obtained assuming that hours per employee are
stationary.
The shocks [η ν y s e y] are the structural shocks that drive the model, and the
impact coefficients λij describe the within-period response to those shocks. The autore-
gressive coefficients are directly related to the persistence of the transitory movements
in the series. The relative importance of permanent movements for the dynamics of em-
ployment is captured by the ratio of the volatilities of the permanent shocks, ση and σv,
relative to the variances of the cyclical shocks, and by the percentage of the movements
in employment that are explained by each type of shock.
In order to identify the impact coefficients, I assume that firms take sales as exogenous
4The non-zero correlation is meant to capture two facts. First, permanent shocks that increase produc-
tivity mean that less employees are needed to produce a unit of output. Second, productivity shocks
that lead to higher income may lead to preference shifts or to simply enjoying more leisure time, if
income is sufficiently high. Based on these interpretations, one would expect the correlation between
the two permanent shocks to be negative. The model does not restrict the correlation to be negative
a priori; rather, it is estimated from the data.
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within a period, and the only shocks that affect transitory sales are permanent output
shocks and transitory sales shocks. This identification scheme is standard in the literature
on inventory management, and it also closely mirrors the usual VECM timing assumption
that production is set based on expected sales. The transitory component of output is af-
fected by the permanent shocks to output, the transitory sales shock, and an independent
structural y shock that can be interpreted as an inventory mistake shock that does not
depend on demand. The transitory component of employment is affected by permanent
output shocks and by transitory shocks to sales, inventories, and by idiosyncratic employ-
ment shocks. Within a period, hours per employee are affected by permanent shocks to
output, by transitory sales, inventory, employment shocks, and by their own transitory
shocks. The inclusion of inventory shocks is motivated by Galeotti et al. (2005), who
use a theoretical model of employment and hours that integrates inventory and labor
decisions both at the intensive and at the extensive margin for the pre-jobless recoveries
period. They show that ignoring inventory decisions can lead to distorted inference about
the cost of adjusting employment.
The impact coefficients λij capture the response of the observed variables to the uncor-
related structural shocks. These coefficients play two important roles in this framework.
They provide a way to orthogonalize the shocks that does not depend on restricting the
responses of the cyclical components beyond the exogeneity restrictions implied by equa-
tions 8 through 11. The orthogonalization scheme used here nests the orthogonalization
scheme used in the VAR models that study the response of hours to technology shocks
(see, for example, Gali, 1999, or Rios-Rull et al., 2011), but it allows for the possibil-
ity that shocks other than productivity can have non-zero effects in the long run. By
using impact coefficients I allow the permanent and the transitory movements to be cor-
related, and allow for slow cyclical adjustment to permanent movements, while keeping
the structural shocks uncorrelated. Second, they are directly related to the sensitivity of
the transitory components to structural shocks. In particular, the impact coefficients on
employment and hours per employee can be interpreted as adjustment coefficients that
measure the sensitivity of employment and hours to permanent and transitory shocks.
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The polynomials Φ(L) capture the autoregressive dynamics of the transitory compo-
nents. The autoregressive polynomials Φi(L) = 1 − φiL − .. − φi,piLpi are assumed to
have roots strictly outside the unit circle for i = y, s, emp,h. As discussed in Morley et al.
(2003), an unobserved components model with correlated shocks is identified given suffi-
ciently rich dynamics. To ensure identification in this model pi has to be greater than 1
for each i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Following most of the UC literature, I set pi = 2 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.The
structural shocks are assumed to be Gaussian. The model given by equations (1)-(11) is
a restricted four-variate unobserved components similar to the the unrestricted models
used by Sinclair (2009) and Basistha (2009).5
It is well-known that there was a general decline in volatility in real macroeconomic
variables around 1984, and this decline in volatility has been well documented in the liter-
ature (see, for example Kim and Nelson (1999), or McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000)),
and there is a general consensus that the break in variance occurred between 1983 and
1985. There is also a general consensus in the jobless recovery literature that the change
in the behavior of employment also occurred around the mid 1980s. Since the timing of
the start of the Great Moderation and the timing of the start of the jobless recoveries
period is not the primary focus of this chapter, I treat the break as exogenous. Engemann
and Owyang (2010) estimate a univariate smooth transition model for employment, both
aggregate and sectoral, where they allow the break date in the speed of adjustment of
employment to be endogenous. Their estimated break dates also coincide with the start
of the Great Moderation, implying that treating the break as exogenous and occurring
around 1984 is a plausible assumption. I estimate the baseline model separately for the
pre-Great Moderation period (1948q1 1983q4) and for the post-Great Moderation Period
(1984Q1-2012q1), allowing the autoregressive coefficients, the volatilities of the structural
shocks, and the impact coefficients to change across subsamples. By allowing both the
impact coefficients and the variances to change, I allow the correlation between the shocks
to the cyclical components and the trend components to differ across subsamples.
5In particular, it is equivalent to a model where the correlation between employment trend and the
cyclical components of all variables can be expressed as functions of the correlations between the
output trend and the cyclical components and the correlations between the cyclical components.
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In this setup, changes in employment can occur through any of the three channels
implied by the theoretical models. To distinguish between the competing theories, I
focus on three sets of key questions:
1. How much of the relative fluctuations in employment can be explained by perma-
nent shocks, and how much can be explained by transitory shocks? Do cyclical
movements explain movements during recessions and recoveries after 1984? If there
jobless recoveries are caused by permanent shocks, then there should be signifi-
cant evidence of increasing importance of permanent movements relative to cyclical
movements, both across the business cycle, and in particular during recessions and
recoveries.
2. Are there significant changes in the persistence of transitory movements in sales and
output? Is there significant evidence of overhang at the late stages of an expansion?
If there is evidence that employment is significantly above its long-run trend level at
the end of the expansions, this would provide support in favor of the organizational
restructuring theory. If employment is above its long run trend level at the end
of the recessions, and there is evidence that the persistence of output and sales
declined, this would provide evidence in favor of Bachmann’s (2011) model.
3. Can the different responses of employment to output shocks be explained by the
change in the sensitivity of employment and hours to overall economic activity? If
employment is more sensitive to sales shocks, and initial adjustments occur on the
intensive margin, this would provide evidence in favor of a switch towards just-in-
time production.
My approach is somewhat similar in spirit to Gomme’s (2005) probit approach, looking at
the probability of finding a job and the probability of separation; as well as, Fabergman’s
(2008) SVAR approach using data on output, job creation, and job destruction, and
defining a reallocative and aggregate productivity shock. In both papers, they find that
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the Great Moderation coincided with a change in the dynamics of the labor market.
In contrast with Gomme’s and Fabergman’s approach, who each examine only if there is
evidence of a change in dynamics in the labor market at the start of the Great Moderation,
I formally disentangle the channels implied by the theoretical models, and analyze how
much changes in each of the channels contributed to the changes in employment.
1.5. Empirical Results
1.5.1. Inference and Estimates
The data series used are quarterly U.S. real GDP and real final sales from BEA, total
non-farm payroll employment (converted to quarterly frequency using arithmetic aver-
ages), and Francis and Ramey’s updated measure of aggregate hours divided by the
number of employees. The first subsample covers the period 1948q1-1983q4, and the
second subsample covers the period 1984q1-2012q1. All series are converted to hundred
times the natural logarithm of the raw data series.
The linear UC model that restricts µit = 0 has 28 parameters for each subsample, and
it is identical to a reduced-form vector error correction model that has both a VAR and
a vector MA component. Given the fact that the model is parameter-rich, estimation is
conducted using Bayesian methods. In particular, I use a multi-block random walk chain
with a Student-t proposal version of the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm. There are
two main advantages of using Bayesian estimation over maximum likelihood estimation
in this framework. First, the Bayesian approach allows me to directly capture the uncer-
tainty about the parameters when performing counterfactual analysis. Second, previous
research that uses UC models to decompose trend and cycle movements in macroeconomic
variables frequently finds that the estimated parameters for many US macroeconomic se-
ries are close to the boundary of the parameter space, which can lead to the well-known
pile-up problem. For example, Sinclair (2009), uses a bivariate model for unemployment
and output and finds correlations that are very close to -1, and Basistha (2009) uses a
17
four-variate model for productivity, inflation, output per capita, and hours per capita,
and finds that some of the trend variances in the labor market variables are close to 0.
Using Bayesian methods allows me to find an interior mode of the posterior,even with
non-informative priors, thus circumventing the pile-up problem. The parameters were es-
timated by casting the model into state-space form, and updating each parameter at each
MH draw. The state-space representation for the UC model and a detailed description
of the sampler and the priors are provided in the Appendix.
If the changes in employment behavior occurred due to increasing importance of trend
movements, then the ratio of the trend volatility to volatility of the cycle in employment
should increase, as should the implied correlation between the total employment trend
and cycle. If there is significant evidence in favor of restructuring because of long expan-
sions,there should be a significant employment overhang at the end of the expansions.
On the other hand, if jobless recoveries can be explained by a switch to just-in-time em-
ployment practices or due to similar structural changes in the labor market, one would
expect both the ratio λes/λey and the impact coefficients on hours per capita to increase
significantly. Looking at the point estimates for the structural parameters allows me to
directly compare if the changes in the dynamics of employment were caused by increasing
importance of trend movements, or if there was a significant change in the persistence of
the cyclical movements.
Table 2 presents the median estimates for the persistence of the cycles, measured by
the sum of the autoregressive coefficients, and the estimates for the key volatility and
impact coefficients.The autoregressive coefficients φi1, φi2 (and thus the persistence of the
cyclical components) are very similar across subsamples for all series. There is no evidence
of a significant change in persistence of the output and sales cycle. The changes in the
behavior of the responses of employment and hours to structural shocks come from the
changes in the impact coefficients, rather than from changes in persistence.
The estimated volatilities of both the permanent shocks to output, η, and the cyclical
components of output and sales, σs and σy, are lower for the second subsample, which is
not surprising, because the break is chosen to coincide with the start of the Great Mod-
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eration. A particularly important result in this framework is not the decline in volatility,
but the decline in the ratio of the volatility of the output relative to the volatility of
sales. Before the start of the Great Moderation, the median estimate for the ratio of
the volatility of the cyclical structural shocks of output to the volatility of the cyclical
structural shocks to sales was 1.45. After 1984, the ratio drops to 0.98. Together with
the change in the impact coefficients on sales, the change in this ratio explains a lot of the
observed behavior in employment after 1984, as shown in the next two subsections. The
impact coefficients for the permanent output shock do not change drastically after the
break. It is, however, important to note that the impact coefficients for the permanent
shock η on employment and hours are negative. The median estimated impact coefficient
λeη is -0.14 for the first subsample and -0.22 for the second subsample, and both of those
parameters are significant. The median estimated impact coefficient λhη is -0.18 for the
first subsample, and -0.25 for the second subsample, and again the credibility intervals for
both estimates do not cover zero, even when using conservative 95% credibility intervals.
Contrary to predictions from RBC models, permanent shocks to productivity have a tran-
sitory negative impact on hours and employment, implying that hours and employment
do not adjust to steady-state immediately following a permanent shock. Even though
I use different measure of hours and productivity, the implied correlations between the
shocks η and uh are also close to the parameter estimates obtained by Basistha (2009),
who looks at the correlations between productivity, hours per capita, and inflation. The
negative impact coefficients are at odds with RBC predictions, but they are consistent
with Gali’s (1999) New-Keynesian DSGE model where productivity shocks have tempo-
rary negative effect on hours. The impact coefficients λeη and λhη and the correlation
between the productivity shocks and the demographic shocks do not change significantly
across subsamples, implying that there is no evidence that permanent technology shocks
have become more important in explaining movements in employment after 1984.6
The largest change occurred in the impact coefficients λey, λes, λhy, λhs, which capture
6The approach used here assumes that the coefficients are stable within a subsample, but it is interesting
to note that the implied median estimates of the correlation between sales growth and inventory
growth ∆it = yt− st are broadly consistent with the median estimates from the TVP model used by
Benati and Lubik (2012).
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the sensitivity of the employment and hours cycles to transitory inventory/ non sales
shocks, y, and sales shocks, s. The median estimate for the impact coefficient of sales on
employment, λes , was 0.35 before 1984, and 0.87 after 1984. Before the Great Moderation,
a positive sales shock equal to 1 increases log employment by 0.3%, and after 1984, a
positive cyclical sales shocks increases employment by almost 0.9%. If one only looks at
the impact coefficients, these results imply that within a quarter, the effect of a positive
structural inventory shock equal to 1 on employment has gone down by approximately
50% (from 0.11 down to 0.06), and the effects of a positive structural shock to sales on
employment has gone up by a factor of almost 3. The change in the impact coefficients
of sales and non-sales output shocks on hours per employee is just as striking. Before the
Great Moderation, hours per employee responded positively to inventory shocks within
a quarter, but the response was only about 60% of the response of hours to inventory
shocks after 1984 (0.2 vs 0.33). In addition to the large changes in the impact coefficients
of sales and other output shocks on employment, there is a large change in the impact
coefficient of employment of hours. The impact coefficient changes from 0.68 to −0.13,
and the change is statistically significant. This switch from positive to negative impact
coefficient is also consistent with a switch towards just-in-time employment. After 1984,
a negative shock to employment is associated with an increase in hours per employee,
whereas employment and hours per employee used to be positively correlated before
1984.
The changes in the relative ratios of the variances and the impact coefficients are
consistent with the switch to just-in-time employment hypothesis that postulates that if
firms are using more flexible labor inputs, the responses of hours and aggregate hours
would increase much more after the break, and that the response of employment to sales
should increase after the break. In order to further disentangle how much of the movement
in employment and hours can be attributed to the permanent shocks, and how the change
in the impact coefficients affected the path of the employment, I perform counterfactual
simulations that allow me to address those questions directly.
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1.5.2. Cyclical Shocks and Employment Overhang
Both the sectoral shift hypothesis and the job polarization hypothesis imply that at the
aggregate level, permanent movements became relatively more important than cyclical
movements, both on average, and during recessions and recoveries. In the unobserved
components framework, this means that the variance of the overall employment trend
increased relative to the variance of the overall employment cycle, that the correlation
between the trend and the cycle component increased in absolute value, or both. However,
the empirical results do not show a significant decline in the relative volatility. While there
is an overall decline in volatility, there is no evidence that the overall employment trend
became more important relative to the employment cycle. The variance of the overall
trend component in employment decreased from 0.62 to 0.35, and the total variance of
the cyclical component decreased from 0.94 to 0.51, leaving the ratio virtually unchanged
(0.66 vs 0.68). Furthermore, the overall trend and the cycle are significantly negatively
correlated in both subsamples. The correlation is -0.88 with standard deviation of 0.10 for
the first subsample, and -0.91 with standard deviation of 0.7 for the second subsample.
The large negative correlations indicate slow adjustment of employment to permanent
shocks, but there is no evidence that the correlation, and thus the speed of adjustment
has changed.
In order to examine if cyclical movements play a role during recessions and recoveries
after 1984, I set up a counterfactual experiment that is similar in spirit to the historical
decompositions by Gali and Rabanal (2005), Santaeulalia-Llopis (2012), and Gali, Smets,
and Wouters (2012). The goal of this experiment is to examine how much of the movement
in employment over time can be attributed to each structural shock. The set up is
straightforward: given the observed shocks, I simulate the path of employment for the
case when only permanent shocks affect the system, and for the case when only one of
the structural cyclical shocks affects the system. To account for parameter uncertainty,
at each iteration of the MH sampler after the burn-in I feed the observed shocks for the
given parameter draw through the system using the first two quarters of 1984 as the
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initial values. Figure 2 plots the posterior mode for the simulated series.
Since the shocks η and ν are correlated, they are fed through the system jointly. This
decomposition of the path of employment is different from the standard trend-cycle de-
composition in UC models because the movements due to the permanent shocks account
for movements in the stochastic trend and for movements in the cyclical component that
are caused by permanent shocks. The left panel of Figure 2 plots the observed path of
employment (solid blue), the median path of employment caused by permanent shocks
and adjustments to permanent shocks (dashed red line), and the median path for move-
ments due to purely cyclical shocks (patterned green, scale on the right axis). The right
panel plots the decomposition of the cyclical component: solid black line is fluctuations
due to sales shocks, and the dashed green line is fluctuations due to other output shocks.
As illustrated in Figure 2, there is no evidence of employment overhang at the end of the
expansions; employment is very close to its trend level, with the exception of recessions
and recoveries themselves. The slow adjustment of cyclical movements to permanent
shocks is evidenced by the fact that employment is briefly above its trend level during
the initial period after a negative shock hits the economy. There is no cyclical overhang
at the end of the expansions, nor at the end of the recessions. Furthermore, movements
that are caused by cyclical fluctuations are quite volatile, in particular during recessions
and recoveries. The movements in employment caused by purely transitory shocks match
up the NBER recessions and the period following the recession quite well. The recessions
and the jobless recovery periods cannot be solely attributed to permanent shocks or
adjustments to those shocks only.
The right panel of Figure 2 decomposes the part of employment driven by purely
transitory shocks by type of shock: movements caused by sales shocks and movement
caused by other output shocks (inventories). The overall median contribution of sales
shocks to the variance caused by cyclical movements in employment increased from 24.2%
before 1984 to 34.8% after 1984, while the contribution of other output shocks fell from
53% to 35.4%. This is particularly evident during the recession and recovery phase, as
sales shocks drive a lot of the cyclical movements in employment, which is consistent with
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the just-in-time theory.
The decomposition of the hours per employee series is also consistent with this assump-
tion. Figure 3 shows the decomposed path of hours per employee: the patterned blue
line is the observed path, the red dashed line is fluctuations due to permanent shocks,
the solid black line is fluctuations due to sales shocks, and the patterned green line is
fluctuations due to other output shocks. A lot of the fluctuations do come from responses
to the permanent shocks, but the cyclical shocks play a large role during recessions and
the periods immediately following the recessions.
As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, a large portion of the volatility in employment and
hours per employee cannot be explained solely by permanent shocks and adjustments
to those permanent shocks, as suggested by the sectoral shift hypothesis. Permanent
shocks and adjustments to permanent shocks drive most of the dynamics during normal
periods, but their relative importance has not increased after 1984, and cyclical shocks
still play a significant role in explaining the dynamics of hours and employment over
the business cycle, especially during recessions and the periods immediately following
recessions. Furthermore, there is no evidence that employment is significantly above
trend at the end of the expansions. These decompositions are consistent with the just-
in-time employment scenario.
1.5.3. The Role of the Impact Coefficients and Estimated Job Losses
When disentangling the role of the different channels implied by the theoretical models,
one of the key issues is to what extent the change in the impact coefficients (i.e in the
sensitivity of employment and hours to real macroeconomic shocks) affected the path of
employment and hours. In order to shed light on this question and to isolate the effects
of each impact coefficient, I perform counterfactual analysis where I change only one of
the impact coefficients to its pre-Great Moderation value, and leave all other parameters
at their post-1984 values. The approach used here is similar in spirit to the approach
used by Kim, Morley and Piger (2008), who use counterfactual analysis to analyze the
sources of the Great Moderation, and to the approach used by Morley and Singh (2012),
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who use counterfactual analysis to study the role of inventory mistakes for the reduction
in the volatility of output relative to the volatility of sales. The counterfactual analysis
is performed as follows:
• the pre-1984 results were obtained first
• for a given parameter draw from the MH sampler for the second subsample, the
impact coefficient of interest was substituted with the mode for the pre-1984 value
• the observed residuals for the draw (obtained using the MH parameter draw) were
orthogonalized and fed through the system using the impact coefficient from the
first subsample
Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix plot the observed series for employment and the simulated
series, and the observed series for hours and the simulated series. The observed path of
the series is plotted in blue. The green “cloud” is the 90% CI for the counterfactual path
when the sales impact coefficients are set to their pre-GM values, and the red “cloud” is
the 90% CI for the counterfactual path when the non-sales output impact coefficients are
set to their pre-GM values. These experiments illustrate the importance of the change
in the impact coefficients, and they also illustrate that the slow growth in employment
cannot be solely attributed to particularly adverse output shocks, as suggest by Gali,
Smets, and Wouters (2012). If the impact coefficients on employment had not changed,
employment would have exhibited patterns similar to those observed prior to 1984- a
rapid decline at the start of the recession caused by a negative shock, and a rapid bounce
back. However, because the impact coefficients did change, the observed series exhibits
much smaller responses to non-sales shocks.7 As mentioned above, this is particularly
evident when large shocks hit the economy, which is exactly the case of recessions and
the positive shocks that get the economy out of a recession. Hours per employee are much
7Even though the AR coefficients did not change significantly, and the cyclical component still plays a
very important role, if one were to look only at the growth rates of employment, the result presented
here would lead to a “loss of cyclicality” in the employment growth series, which is in line with the
findings of Engemann and Owyang.
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more procyclical after the break. When holding the impact parameters at their pre-break
levels, the hours per employee cycle is much less volatile, and it takes longer for hours to
return to their pre-recession levels. Again, these results are in line with the theory that
firms have switched to utilizing more flexible labor inputs.
Of course, a key question for policy analysis is how many jobs were lost due to this shift
towards adjusting on the intensive margin. The cumulative job losses due to the change in
the impact coefficients (obtained by integrating the difference between the counterfactual
path and the observed path for the three years following the trough) are quite large
and significant. Three years after the 1990-1991 Recession, between 160,000-190,000 jobs
were lost due to this switch. The estimate for the 2001 recession is between 0.9 and 1.31
million. The model implies that the Great Recession was caused by a mix of a a large
adverse permanent shock and and negative transitory shocks. The estimates for the job
losses caused by the change in the responses to cyclical shocks are slightly smaller than
for the 2001 recession, but still large and significant: between 0.4 and 0.7 million. The
estimates for the first two recoveries are comparable to the estimates obtained from the
univariate model used by Engemann and Owyang (2010).
The counterfactual analysis illustrates that cyclical fluctuations still play an important
role in explaining the movements in employment and hours per employee. Sales shocks
play a much more important role in explaining employment fluctuations than other output
shocks. Combined with the decline of the volatility of output relative to the volatility of
sales, the results support a switch to just-in-time utilization of labor resources.
1.5.4. Robustness
Sectoral Results
The results presented in the previous section show that cyclical fluctuations still play
an important role and they support the switch to just-in-time production at the aggre-
gate level. However, in order to fully distinguish between the competing theories, one
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would also need to look at disaggregate industry-level data. The sectoral shift hypothesis
states that cyclical fluctuations play a declining role in explaining movements in employ-
ment, and that at the sectoral level, almost all of the movements in employment for the
post-break period can be explained by permanent shocks. On the other hand, if jobless
recoveries can be explained by organizational restructuring, the changes should be more
drastic in industries that have been expanding at fast rates before a recessionary negative
shock hits the economy.
In order to test the just-in-time hypothesis at the disaggregate level, I look at the sectors
that are emphasized by Groshen and Potter (2003) when explaining the movement of
jobs across industries: manufacturing (durables and nondurables), services, and finance,
real estate, and insurance. If the sectoral shift hypothesis holds, permanent shocks and
adjustments to permanent shocks should explain most of the movements in employment
in all of the sectors, and this change in the importance of permanent movements should be
more pronounced when using disaggregated data. If the structural reorganization holds,
then there should be significant overhang at the end of the expansion phase in the finance
sector. On the other hand, if changes in the dynamics of employment occurred due to an
overall switch to just-in-time labor management practices, the results should be robust
to disaggregation, and the change in the relative size of the impact coefficients should
be evident across industries. In order to distinguish between the competing theories,
I estimate an unobserved components model for each sector for the period before 1984
and after 1984. The nominal data series for output and sales are obtained from BEA-
NIPA and converted to real terms using the industry price deflators, also from BEA.
The employment and hours series were obtained from BLS8. The sample size covered the
period 1964q1-2011q2, due to the hours series being available only after 1964. Again, the
model was estimated using hundred times the log of all the series.
8Using Francis and Ramey’s series for disaggregated employment by industry leads to similar results.
Since the sectoral data used here is aggregated, most firms that were classified as belonging to these
industries under SIC did not change their classification under NAICS. To ensure that the results are
robust, I also estimated the results by rescaling the nominal data to match at the point of conversion,
and separately before and after the conversion. This did not affect the results significantly.
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Manufacturing Sector
The manufacturing sector is particularly interesting because it has been used to show
evidence both in favor of the sectoral shift hypothesis (Groshen and Potter, 2003), and in
favor of changing labor demand and moving from adjusting labor on extensive margins
to adjusting labor on extensive margins (see, for example, Ramey and Vine, 2006, and
Hetrick, 2000), which is consistent with switching to just-in-time production. Further-
more, Engemann and Owyang find that most of the change in cyclicality in employment
is due to large changes in the manufacturing sector.
The parameter estimates for the sectoral results are given in Tables 4 and 5 in the Ap-
pendix. The results for the manufacturing sector are similar to those obtained aggregate
data, and four key results stand out. First, most of the dynamics in both subsamples
is driven by permanent shocks and adjustments to permanent shocks, but the relative
importance of the permanent shocks has not increased over time. Second, there is a
reduction in volatility in all of the cyclical components, and a reduction in the volatility
of output relative to the volatility of sales. Third, the increase in the impact coefficients
of sales relative to the impact coefficients on inventories is similar, but larger than the
increases for aggregate data. Fourth, the estimated impact coefficient of employment on
hours per employee is positive in the first subsample, but negative in the second subsam-
ple. There is no significant reduction or increase in the persistence of the cycles. All of
these results support the just-in-time hypothesis. This is consistent with the assumption
that due to using more flexible labor inputs firms can adjust hours much more easily than
they can adjust payroll employment, they are able to set output closer to sales, and any
cyclical shocks affect hours much more than they affect employment. The results are very
similar for when the series is further disaggregated into manufacturing of durables and
nondurables.
Rapidly Growing Sectors with Long Expansions
Compared to other industries, employment in the services sector, in particular in the
financial services sector, exhibited very rapid growth after 1984. The average growth
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rate for the services sector was 0.756% per quarter, and 0.423% per quarter for the
financial sector, with minimal downward swings during the NBER expansion phase. If
the organizational restructuring theory holds, then recoveries in this sector should be
particularly lagged and drawn out. However, Figure 7 in the appendix illustrates that the
dynamics of employment during the past three recoveries was comparable to the dynamics
of employment in the manufacturing sector, and to the behavior of aggregate employment.
The estimates from the formal econometric model, shown in Tables 6 and 7, confirm this.9
The impact coefficients of non-sales output shocks on hours per employee increase by
more than 150% in the second subsample, the impact coefficient of other output shocks on
employment decreases by 70%, and the impact coefficient of employment on hours become
negative in the second subsample. The increase in the impact coefficients of other output
shocks on hours per employee, coupled with the change in the sign of the impact coefficient
of employment on hours per employee indicates that in the second subsample, output
increases on impact mostly through increasing hours per employee, and not by increasing
the number of employees, which is consistent with just-in-time employment practices.
It is important to note the change in the impact coefficients is not as drastic as the
change in the manufacturing sector. The variance of permanent shocks increases relative
to the variance of cyclical shocks, but this increase is not statistically significant. This
points that movements in the services sector may include sectoral shifts or organizational
restructuring, but that the cyclical component also shows strong evidence in favor of
switching to just-in-time production.
Other Robustness Issues
The Effects of the Great Recession
In the past two years, there has been an ongoing debate if the Great Recession was
the end of the Great Moderation. If the start of the Great Recession marked the return
of a more volatile economic climate. To ensure that the results are not distorted by the
9The model is similar to the model given by equations (1)-(11), only adjusted to reflect the fact that
in these sectors, when using data at quarterly frequency, output and sales can be treated as being
roughly equal. The details of the model and the state-space representation are given in the Appendix.
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presence of large outliers and change in dynamics during the past three years, I reestimate
the model given by equations (1)-(11), but the second subsample is shorter and ends at
2007Q3. The last column of Table 3 gives the estimates and the standard deviations for
the key volatility and impact parameters for the shorter subsample. Not surprisingly,
the standard deviations of almost all the estimates are slightly larger when including the
Great Recession, but none of the parameter estimates change significantly, implying that
including the Great Recession data does not distort the results. This is in line with the
results obtained by Stock and Watson (2012), who find that the Great Recession was
driven by the same dynamics as the the previous two recessions, but the shocks were
larger. The Great Recession was larger and deeper than the previous two recessions, but
the recovery and the responses of employment mimic those observed during the previous
two recoveries.
Alternative Measures of Hours and Stochastic Trend in Hours
The literature that studies the relationship between output shocks and hours usually
focuses on aggregate hours or on hours per capita, not on hours per employee. However,
there is much contention about the proper way to model hours and hours per capita,
and about the presence of a stochastic or deterministic trend in the series (for a de-
tailed literature review, see, for example, Basistha, 2009, Francis and Ramey, 2009, or
Santaulalia-Llopis, 2012). Francis and Ramey’s main criticism of using aggregate hours
or aggregate hours per capita and not accounting for a demographic trend will tend to
overestimate the effects of permanent technology shocks on transitory hours and bias
them upwards. Santaeulalia-Llopis, on the other hand, finds that when he allows for
preference shocks that are correlated with output shocks, hours per capita respond pos-
itively to technology shocks. The UC model used here is immune to those identification
issues, because indirectly nests both Francis and Ramey’s model and Santaeulalia-Llopis’
model by allowing the trend in employment to have two separate components that are
not perfectly correlated (output shocks and “other” shocks). The trend κt is allowed to
mix the demographic and the preference trends, without making it necessary to identify
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them separately, and this trend does not enter the hours per employee series directly.
Note that aggregate hours are decomposed as total employment multiplied by hours per
employee, the “other” permanent shocks does not affect this series directly within a pe-
riod. Furthermore, focusing on hours per employee rather than hours per capita has the
advantage that the movements in hours per employee have a direct interpretation based
on the theoretical models. As illustrated in the theoretical motivation in Section 1.2, if
firms want to adjust total hours (which is the target variable in all standard theoretical
models), they can do so by changing the number of employees, changing the hours per
employee (“intensity”), or through a combination of both approaches.
Allowing for the possibility that hours per employee have a time-varying drift or low-
frequency movements that might distort the results10, the results do not change signifi-
cantly. Reestimating the model by changing equation 11 to
Φ4(L)(ht − µt) = λhτηt + λhyy + λhss + λhee + h
where
µt = µt−1 + µt
and µt is assumed to be Gaussian with variance σµ and uncorrelated with all other shocks
(following Basistha, 2009), leads to very small estimates for σµ . The median estimate is
0.051 (0.033) in the first subsample, 0.050 (0.041) in the second subsample, and all the
other parameter estimates are virtually identical to those presented in Table 2. Using the
BLS index of aggregate weekly hours (cutting the first subsample to 1964q1-1983q4) or
Rios-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis’ measure of aggregate hours (keeping the full sample
1948q1-2011q4) to calculate hours per employee leads to very similar qualitative results.
The impact coefficients are different in magnitude (reflecting the scaling of the hours
series), but the ratio of the pre-break to the post-break impact coefficients is the same as
the ratios obtained using Francis and Ramey’s BLS series for aggregate hours.
10 Therefore assuming that the unit root and stationarity tests did not have correct finite sample size or
power.
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1.6. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have investigated the importance of a structural change in the rela-
tionship between permanent and transitory movements in real macroeconomic activity for
explaining the past three jobless recoveries. A large part of the movement in employment
and hours can still be explained by cyclical fluctuations, and the relative importance of
transitory movements has not changed significantly after 1984. Most of the change in
the dynamics of employment is due to an increase in the relative importance of sales
shocks, and due to a change in the sensitivity and hours per employee to these shocks.
After 1984, sales shocks play a much more important role in explaining the movements
in employment.
Rather than committing to opening full-time positions, firms can accommodate tem-
porary increases in demand by temporarily increasing hours until sales have picked up
enough for the recovery to be considered robust. The results obtained using disaggre-
gated data confirm that firms have switched towards increasing output by increasing
hours rather than by increasing employment, meaning that it became easier to increase
hours per current employee (or aggregate hours by utilizing flexible labor inputs) rather
than by increasing employment, but this switch is not primarily driven by a change in
the persistence of output or sales movements.
Further extensions of this work will explore the relationship between real economic
activity, labor market variables, and the financial sector, allowing for the possibility that
movements in the financial sector and financial conditions can lead to slow recoveries in
the labor market, as proposed in the theoretical models used by Gu (2012) and Abo-Zaid
(2012). Also, I plan to allowing for a distinct recession or bounceback phase in the cyclical
components of the variable, where the switching times are estimated from the data, and
not necessarily restricted to happen exactly during NBER recessions. In addition, once
more data becomes available, allowing for an additional break at the time of the Great
Recession will allow me to test if the behavior during the Great Recession and recovery
was significantly different from the behavior during the 1990 and 2001 recession.
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2. State-Dependent Effects of Fiscal Policy
2.1. Introduction
The Great Recession and the subsequent American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
fiscal stimulus package reignited debate, academic and otherwise, about the stabilization
role of discretionary fiscal policy. More broadly, these developments have raised questions
about the relevance of aggregate demand and government spending as possible engines of
economic activity. As a way to answer these questions, many recent academic studies have
sought to determine whether government spending has significant effects on aggregate
output and components of output, such as consumption and investment.
This debate is of central importance not only for economic policy, but also for the
insights it provides into the underlying structure of modern developed economies. The-
oretical models in which resources are fully employed predict that the direct effect of a
positive shock to government spending, given preferences and technology, should com-
pletely crowd out private economic activity. The direct government spending multiplier
arising from such models is zero, at least as a first approximation.11 In contrast, tradi-
tional Keynesian models predict that the economy will not always fully employ available
resources, possibly for extended periods of time, because of insufficient demand. If output
is below its potential level due to insufficient aggregate demand, an increase in government
spending can directly motivate the employment of idle resources and raise output.
Much of the recent empirical research on fiscal policy considers the effects of spending
shocks on different components of output. On the one hand, a baseline neoclassical
model predicts crowding out of both consumption and investment, and therefore implies
negative responses of these variable to a positive shock to government spending. On the
other hand, if government spending raises resource use through traditional Keynesian
channels, consumption and investment should respond positively to spending shocks.
11These models can generate indirect allocational effects of government spending on output, but of
ambiguous sign. For example, the higher interest rate or negative wealth effect (see, for example,
Parker, 2011) induced by a rise in government spending could encourage higher labor supply that
raises output, but higher interest rates also reduce capital accumulation that lowers output.
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Indeed, these spillovers create the possibility that the government spending multiplier
exceeds one because higher government spending induces increases in other components
of demand.
Most of the existing empirical research on fiscal policy employs linear time series models
in which the size of the response of output or other variables to government spending is
independent of the state of the economy (important recent exceptions include Mittnik and
Semmler, 2012, and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012a; see the following subsection).
The results from such models are useful, especially if the maintained null hypothesis
is the neoclassical baseline of zero effects on output and crowding out of consumption
and investment. But the Keynesian alternative suggests an important state dependence
(and therefore a nonlinearity) in the effect of any demand shock on output, including a
government spending shock. Higher demand cannot raise output indefinitely. Eventually,
resource constraints bind: even a Keynesian economy behaves like a neoclassical system if
demand is sufficiently high. Threshold models provide a natural econometric framework
for exploring this basic state dependence. If government spending shocks affect output
through Keynesian demand channels, such effects will be be larger when the economy has
significant resource slack than when it is operating at or near full capacity. The purpose
of this chapter, then, is to test this simple, but fundamentally important hypothesis.
To investigate the possibility of state-dependent effects of fiscal policy, I estimate a
nonlinear structural vector autoregressive model that allows parameters to switch ac-
cording to whether a threshold variable crosses an estimated threshold. As candidate
threshold variables, I consider several alternative measures of economic slack, as well as
the debt-to-GDP ratio and a measure of the real interest rate. Various statistical and
economic criteria identify capacity utilization (adjusted for a structural break) as the best
threshold variable, but the main findings are robust to the other measures of slack.
The empirical results provide strong evidence in favor of state-dependent nonlinearity;
specifically, government spending shocks have larger effects on output when they occur
with relatively low resource utilization than when they appear at times of high resource
use. Furthermore, threshold estimates for capacity utilization place half or more of its
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historical observations in the low-utilization regime. This evidence implies, therefore,
that the “normal” state of the U.S. economy is one in which positive demand shocks
have large positive and persistent effects on output and its components. I also employ
simulation-based impulse-response functions to isolate the different effects of fiscal policy
under particular economic conditions. I find that the responses of output and output
components depend crucially on the state of the economy when a policy shock occurs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews previous research
that has estimated the aggregate effects of fiscal policy in a time-series context. Section
2.3 introduces the baseline empirical model and the estimation method. Section 2.4
presents the empirical results and extends the baseline model to models that include
consumption, investment, and other variables of interest. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Related Literature
The empirical literature that explores the effects of government spending on macroe-
conomic variables, both old and new, is divided in its findings. Most studies fall in one
of four main strands: models based on traditional Keynesian theory, structural vector
autoregressive (SVAR) models, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models,
and models based on the narrative approach first introduced by Ramey and Shapiro
(1998).
Traditional Keynesian models usually relate an outcome variable such as aggregate
output to different components of spending or taxes, typically with a reduced-form, linear
specification. The interest rate is usually held fixed over the whole forecasting horizon,
and the multipliers obtained from those models are often very large (always greater than
1, sometimes as big as 4). In particular, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) fiscal stimulus package was designed based on a study of this kind by Romer
and Bernstein (2009) that estimated a short-run multiplier for output of approximately
1.6.
Studies based on SVAR models in which government spending is assumed to be prede-
termined typically find that output, consumption, and real wages increase after a positive
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government spending shock. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2008) find that
the response of output and consumption to government spending is positive and persis-
tent, although, perhaps surprisingly, they find a negative response of investment. This
discrepancy between the positive response of consumption (implied by Keynesian models),
and the negative response of investment (implied by neoclassical models) is commonly
referred to as the “investment puzzle” in the fiscal policy literature. The magnitude of
the estimated effects depends on the identification of the model. Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Perotti (2008) use institutional information to identify the shocks, and they
get government spending multipliers for output that are about 1.3. Mountford and Uhlig
(2009) use an alternative approach based on sign restrictions, and they get a smaller
government spending multiplier for output of 0.5 and a multiplier for consumption that
is very close to zero. These SVAR studies are sometimes criticized because they do not
allow for state-dependent responses (see Parker, 2011, in particular), an issue addressed
here.
Most DSGE studies are based on a New Keynesian model with Calvo pricing frictions
and make a variety of assumptions about whether interest rates adjust to an increase in
government spending. Pappa (2009) uses an DSGE model with Calvo pricing and a fixed
interest rate. She finds that output, real wages, and consumption rise, while investment
falls, but the magnitude of the responses is very sensitive to the parameterization of the
model. Some DSGE models allow for different responses to government spending shocks
depending on the interest rate. For example, Cogan et al. (2010) consider the importance
of interest rate responses to fiscal policy by holding the interest rate pegged at zero for
four quarters, but afterwards allowing the interest rate to revert to the “natural level”
determined by neoclassical first-order conditions. The estimated government spending
multiplier for output from this model is only 0.4, and their simulations yield multipliers
that are above one only when the interest rate is fixed exogenously.12
Van Brusselen (2009), Leigh et al. (2010), and Ramey (2011a) provide extensive surveys
12Although Barro and Redlick (2011) use a simple linear regression model with annual data instead of
a DSGE model, they find that the government spending multiplier for output is just 0.3 on impact,
similar to the DSGE results.
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of the empirical literature on fiscal multipliers. Consistent with the summary above, they
show that the estimated government spending multipliers are highly sensitive to the
model and parameters. In particular, Van Brusselen (2009) compares a wide variety
of empirical models and points out that, even within the same class of models (i.e.,
DSGE models with Calvo pricing), the government spending multiplier for output varies
between -3.7 and 3.7, depending on how the increase in spending is financed, how long
the interest rate is pegged, and whether the economy is closed or open. Ramey (2011a)
also points out the sensitivity of estimates, but concludes that the multiplier for the U.S.
economy likely lies within a range between 0.8 and 1.5. Leeper et al. (2012) examine the
variability of multipliers for output and consumption in DSGE models in great detail,
and they conclude that the estimates are very sensitive to the specification of the model.
In particular, when the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers is large, as in Gal´ı et al.
(2007), the multipliers are large and positive, but they are smaller when the proportion
of rule-of-thumb consumers is closer to zero.
Another strand of the literature uses a narrative approach to identify exogenous gov-
ernment spending shocks. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Eichenbaum et al. (1999), and
Ramey (2011b) find that the response of output is small and short-lived, but they use
military spending rather than total government spending. Ramey (2011b) argues that
the SVAR-based multipliers are large only because they fail to capture the importance
of timing of government shocks and because the combined narrative data Granger-causes
the government spending shocks. However, Perotti (2007) shows that lagged government
spending, tax, and GDP shocks also predict the Ramey-Shapiro narrative dates.
In this chapter, I adopt a nonlinear SVAR-based approach that allows the impact of
shocks to depend on the level of resource utilization at the time of the shock. I do not
impose any assumptions about the response of interest rates or about the degree of price
or wage stickiness, and check the robustness of the results to including military spending
separately in the model. This approach nests the possibility of empirical results consistent
with neoclassical models that predict small or even negative responses of output and other
macro variables to positive government spending shocks. But to the extent that the data
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identify Keynesian effects, the model allows these effects to vary with the state of the
economy that prevails at the time of the shock; that is, I test whether positive responses
are stronger when there is substantial slack in the economy. The size and difference in
the multipliers across regimes is of fundamental interest, and I also consider what the
data tell us about the amount of time the economy spends in the different regimes.
This nonlinear approach is strongly suggested by Parker (2011) and it is similar in
motivation to recent studies by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) and Mittnik and
Semmler (2012), amongst others.13 Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) estimate a
smooth transition threshold SVAR model for government spending, taxes, and output, in
which they impose the restrictions that government spending has different effects during
recessions and expansions, and they calibrate the smoothness parameter based on U.S.
data so that the economy spends about 20% of the time in recessions. They estimate
that the effects of government spending are large and positive (1.7 over 20 quarters)
when the economy is in a recession and smaller (very close to one) when the economy is
not in a recession.14 They control for the state of the business cycle by using a moving
average of output growth as the threshold variable, and they impose that the threshold
around which the behavior changes is equal to the mean of output growth.15 Mittnik and
Semmler (2012) estimate a bivariate threshold model for output and employment where
the threshold output is lagged output growth and threshold is predetermined and equal
to the mean of output growth. In their model, the responses of employment to output
13Recent working papers taking a nonlinear approach include Afonso, Baxa, Slav´ık (2011), Baum and
Koester (2011), Candelon and Lieb (2011), Shoag (2013), and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013).
Also, Kirchner, Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier (2010) take a related time-varying parameter structural
VAR approach.
14Bachmann and Sims (2012) estimate a very similar nonlinear SVAR model to Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012a) and find the same result that government spending shocks have larger effects during
recessions than during expansions. Their additional insight is that these larger effects during reces-
sions appear to operate largely through consumer confidence. In particular, if the response of con-
sumer confidence to government spending shocks is shut down in the calculation of impulse response
functions, the effects are much smaller and similar to the estimated effects in expansions (with or
without the consumer confidence channel).
15In a followup to their original study, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) find that their results for
the U.S. data are largely robust across a large number of OECD countries given the same restric-
tions to identify recessions, but considering a panel structure and direct multi-period single-equation
projections to calculate impulse response functions. Their consideration of a panel structure and
single-equation projections rather than an SVAR model is motivated in part by a lower frequency of
available data for many countries, making statistical identification of a nonlinear SVAR challenging.
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shocks are much larger in the low regime than in the high regime.
The approach used here differs from these two other nonlinear studies of fiscal policy
and aggregate demand in a number of important ways. First, I estimate the threshold that
determines state-dependent effects from the data, whereas Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012a) and Mittnik and Semmler (2012) both assume their thresholds a priori. Because
the threshold is estimated, the model allows the data to sort observations into possibly dif-
ferent multiplier regimes. Based on the estimated thresholds, I find evidence that the U.S.
economy spends the majority of its time in the low-utilization/ high-multiplier state, a
possibility not allowed for by the other two studies. Second, I consider a threshold SVAR
model with a discrete change in regime instead of the smooth transition specification
considered by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a). Although the smooth transition
specification is potentially more general, estimating the smoothness parameter for such
a model can be challenging, as evidenced by the fact that Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012a) fix this parameter (as well as the threshold) in their estimation. The difficulty is
that the likelihood function for a smooth transition model is flat when the true smooth-
ness parameter is large in the sense of implying a relatively discrete threshold, making
maximum likelihood estimation and even Bayesian estimation unreliable. I circumvent
this econometric problem by considering a discrete threshold only, which still allows us
to focus on the primary question of whether there are state-dependent effects of fis-
cal policy. Third, I investigate the role of capacity constraints in generating potential
state-dependent effects by considering various measures of economic slack as threshold
variables, rather than just the growth rate of output, which was the focus of the other
two studies. I also include each measure of slack as an endogenous variable in the SVAR
model to allow the possibility that the variable is important for understanding the ef-
fects of fiscal policy, but does not necessarily relate to a state-dependent effect. Fourth,
unlike the other two studies, I formally compare the nonlinear models to their linear
counterparts using Bayesian marginal likelihood analysis.16
16One exception is Candelon and Lieb (2011), who consider a classical hypothesis test for nonlinearity
in their threshold vector error correction model with fiscal variables and find supportive evidence for
nonlinearity.
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2.3. Empirical Methods
2.3.1. Model
The basic vector autoregression (VAR) model is linear, and cannot capture nonlinear
dynamics such as regime switching and asymmetric responses to shocks. For the analysis
used here, I consider a nonlinear version of a VAR model that extends the threshold
autoregressive model of Tong (1978, 1983) to a multivariate setting. Threshold models
work by splitting a time series process endogenously into different regimes. Within each
regime the process is described by a linear model. In particular, I specify a threshold
version of a reduced-form VAR model as follows:
Yt = Φ
1
0
+ Φ1
1
(L)Yt−1 + (Φ20 + Φ
2
1
(L)Yt−1)I[qt−d > γ] + εt (12)
where Yt is a vector containing the first difference of the logarithm of real government
spending, the first difference of the logarithm of net taxes, the first difference of the
logarithm of real GDP, and an mean-adjusted measure of capacity utilization, as discussed
in more detail below. This is the baseline version of the model. However, I also consider
alternative versions of the model that incorporate the private-sector components (i.e.,
consumption, investment, exports, and imports) and other outcome variables of interest,
again discussed in more detail below.
The lag polynomial matrices Φ11(L) and Φ
2
1(L) capture the dynamics of the system. The
disturbances εt are assumed to be independent and Gaussian with mean zero. Rather
than assuming that the disturbances are strictly i.i.d., the covariance matrix of εt is
set to be equal to Ω until 1984Q1 and equal to λΩ afterwards to capture the Great
Moderation. Because the focus of this paper is not on determining the exact break
date in volatility and because there is near consensus in the literature about the general
timing of the volatility break (see, for example Kim and Nelson, 1999, or McConnell and
Perez-Quiros, 2000),the break date is set exogenously. By using a scale factor λ and a
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constant variance-covariance matrix Ω, I am also assuming that the correlations between
the endogenous variables do not change over time or over regimes. This is important to
ensure that any apparent state-dependent effects of fiscal policy are not merely due to
different identification of structural shocks at different points in time, but rather reflect
a change in the propagation of shocks. The threshold variable qt−d determines the
prevailing regime; γ is the threshold parameter at which the regime switch occurs. The
indicator function I[·] equals 1 when the qt−d exceeds the threshold γ and 0 otherwise.
The integer d is the delay lag for the threshold switch; that is, if the threshold variable
qt−d crosses γ at time t − d, the dynamics actually change at time t. For the threshold
variable, I consider capacity utilization, other measures of economic slack, and a selection
of other macroeconomic variables, as discussed in more detail below.
2.3.2. Data
In addition to capacity utilization, I also consider the output gap estimated by the CBO,
the unemployment rate, output growth, and employment growth to measure economic
slack. The traditional Keynesian theory summarized above implies that the threshold
variable should measure the level of economic activity and intensity of resource use. For
this purpose, the output gap, the level of capacity utilization or the unemployment rate
would seem to be good choices. However, I also consider first differences of these variables
and output and employment growth to check the robustness of the results and to explore
whether threshold effects might relate to growth (as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko,
2012a, and Mittnik and Semmler, 2012) rather than to levels.
Government spending and net taxes are defined as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
The full sample period is 1967Q1-2011Q1. All output components are measured in real
terms and are seasonally adjusted by the source. The series for output, its components,
including government spending, and tax revenues were obtained from NIPA-BEA, and
the capacity utilization series was obtained from the Federal Reserve Statistical Releases
website. I also consider data for U.S. federal government debt, the Federal Funds Rate,
inflation based on the CPI (seasonally adjusted), and non-farm payroll employment, which
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were all obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED website. The monthly
series for capacity utilization, the unemployment rate, the Federal Funds Rate, CPI, and
employment are all converted to a quarterly frequency by using simple arithmetic means.
I use growth rates rather than log-levels in the VAR because the logarithms of real
GDP and output components appear to have stochastic trends according to standard
unit root and stationarity tests, but there is no support for common trends amongst the
variables in any version of the VAR model under consideration. Specifically, Johansen
cointegration tests suggest the absence of cointegrating relationship between government
spending and taxes, between government spending, taxes, and output, as well as be-
tween government spending, taxes, and output components (consumption, investment,
exports, and imports). However, the results are roughly similar results when imposing
cointegration between spending and taxes.
2.3.3. Specification Issues
The lag length for the VAR model is chosen based on the baseline linear VAR model
estimated using maximum likelihood. For this model, both AIC and SIC select four lags,
which is also the number of lags used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Ramey (2011b),
and most other studies that use the linear SVAR approach. Unlike Mittnik and Semmler
(2012), who allow the number of lags to differ across regimes, the number of lags is
assumed to be the same in each regime, and we consider a model with two regimes.
To solve for the SVAR given the reduced-form VAR parameters, I impose short-run
zero restrictions with government spending ordered first and taxes ordered second in all
models; i.e., government spending is assumed to respond to economic conditions only
with a lag, but economic conditions are allowed to respond immediately to government
spending. Implicitly, the approach to solving the SVAR used here assumes that the impact
matrix identifying structural shocks remains the same across regimes and throughout
the entire sample period, with only the size of structural shocks allowed to undergo a
structural break in 1984. This approach avoids any ambiguity about whether the dynamic
effects of government spending shocks appear state-dependent because of a change in their
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identification rather than their propagation.
Economic theory implies several possible choices for the threshold variable. As dis-
cussed above, traditional Keynesian theory suggest that the dynamics may depend on the
state of the economy, while DSGE models imply that the effects of government spending
depend on the interest rate. A recent literature also suggests that the dynamics may
depend on debt (see, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, and Eggertsson and Krug-
man, 2012, for two very different views on the impact of debt on the efficacy of fiscal
policy). Because I do not want to fix the threshold variable a priori, I consider a large set
of possible threshold variables and select the preferred threshold variable using Bayesian
model comparison. The threshold variables considered are
1. lagged output: output growth, long differences in the natural log of output, moving
averages of differences in the natural log of output
2. lagged CBO output gap
3. lagged capacity utilization: level, level adjusted for long-run change in mean, first
differences, and first differences of the mean-adjusted series
4. lagged unemployment rate: level, differences, mean-adjusted level, differences in the
mean-adjusted series
5. lagged debt-to-GDP ratio: total Federal debt and total Federal debt held by the
public, both as a percent of GDP
6. lagged real interest rate: level and change in the ex ante real interest rate based on
the Federal Funds Rate and CPI inflation under the assumption of static expecta-
tions
Both capacity utilization and the unemployment rate appear to have changes in their
long-run mean levels, which would make those series unsuitable for use in a stationary
VAR model. Standard tests for a structural break at an unknown break date reject
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the null of no break in mean for both capacity utilization and the unemployment rate.
Meanwhile, there is some debate about whether the unemployment rate has a unit root
or whether there were just exogenous structural breaks in its mean (see, for example,
Papell et al., 2000). For both series, therefore, I consider the level, first differences, the
mean-adjusted levels, and the differences of the mean-adjusted levels as possible threshold
variables. Table 10 summarizes the results of the test for structural breaks in mean for
capacity utilization and the unemployment rate. A structural break test for capacity
utilization identifies a highly significant break (F statistic of 41.7) in the level of capacity
utilization in 1974Q1, which coincides with the well-known productivity slowdown. The
structural break tests also identify three breaks in mean for the unemployment rate.
Notably, the mean-adjusted capacity utilization series is strongly correlated with other
commonly-used measures of economic activity, as shown in Figure 9, so it appears to be
a highly representative measure of economic slack.17
2.3.4. Estimation and Inference
Because the threshold VAR model is highly parameterized, I make inferences about
the threshold, the coefficients, the threshold variable, and the delay parameter using
Bayesian methods; in particular, I use a multi-block Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm
described in detail in the Appendix to sample from marginal posterior distributions for
parameters and calculate marginal likelihoods for models. The advantages of using a
Bayesian approach in this setting are twofold. First, it allows us to capture the uncertainty
about the parameter values when constructing the impulse response functions. Second,
despite the presence of nuisance parameters in the nonlinear models, comparing the linear
to the nonlinear model and examining the presence of nonlinear effects is straightforward
in the Bayesian framework.
To provide an accurate approximation of the target posterior distribution of the pa-
17Morley and Piger (2012) also find that capacity utilization is closely related to their asymmetric
measure of the business cycle based on a model-averaged forecast-based trend/cycle decomposition
given a wide range of linear and nonlinear time series models of quarterly U.S. real GDP.
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rameters, I follow the standard approach in the applied literature and use a tailored
multivariate Student−t distribution as the proposal distribution. The prior for Φ is a
normal distribution, truncated to ensure stationarity. Ω is inverse-Wishart, λ is Gamma,
and γ is uniform over [ql, qh] where ql and qh are the highest and the lowest observed val-
ues of the the threshold variable.18The priors are diffuse in the sense that the likelihood
strongly dominates the priors for all model parameters. The full technical details of the
posterior sampler and the priors are relegated to the Appendix.
A crucial empirical question is whether the effects of government spending really do
differ across regimes defined by economic slack. In a frequentist setting, to test for the
presence of nonlinear effects, one would consider the null hypothesis H0 : Φ
2
0 = Φ
2
1 = 0
that the coefficients are equal against the alternative that at least one of the elements
of the matrices Φ20 , Φ
2
1 is not zero. This testing problem is tainted by the fact that the
threshold γ is not identified under the null. If the errors are i.i.d., a test with near-optimal
power against alternatives distant from the null hypothesis is the supLR test, but the
asymptotic distribution of the test statistic is nonstandard and has to be approximated
using Hansen’s (1996, 1997) bootstrap procedure. Because the model is very parameter-
rich, bootstrapping the asymptotic distribution is computationally prohibitive. Also, it
should be noted that the 1984Q1 structural break in the variance-covariance matrix of
the disturbances makes it unclear how well Hansen’s procedure would perform in this
setting. The Bayesian approach circumvents such problems by providing a direct method
for comparing models based on the posterior odds ratios.19 In particular, I estimate the
threshold VAR model using the MH algorithm and then compare its marginal likelihood
to that for a restricted linear version of the VAR model for which Φ20 = Φ
2
1 = 0.
Marginal likelihoods are calculated using Chib and Jeliazkov’s (2001) algorithm and I
compare models based on Bayes factors, which are the ratio of marginal likelihoods and
18Using a truncated univariate Student−t prior for γ with mean equal to the maximum likelihood
estimate and 5 degrees of freedom (relatively flat over the observed values) leads to very similar
posterior estimates.
19It should be noted, however, that a bootstrap version of the supLR test for a simpler version of
the model with only government spending, net taxes, and real GDP as endogenous variables and still
using capacity utilization as the threshold variable is significant at the 5% level (under the assumption
that the structural break does not distort the test).
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are equal to posterior odds ratios under even prior odds (i.e., equal prior probabilities on
all models under consideration).
To estimate the effects of shocks to government spending, I calculate impulse-response
functions for output and and other outcome variables in response to a shock to gov-
ernment spending. I do this for two reasons. First, the impulse responses give us the
magnitude of the response of output and its components to government spending, so they
can be used to define the multiplier. Second, when it comes to designing policies, the
response of output is much more important than the coefficient estimates. Because the
impulse responses are nonlinear functions of the coefficients, a small asymmetry in the
coefficients might correspond to a large asymmetry in the impulse responses or vice versa.
Rejecting nonlinearity implies that the impulse responses are necessarily different across
regimes. However, because the responses are complicated highly nonlinear functions of
the coefficients, the degree of this asymmetry can only be evaluated by looking at the
IRFs, rather than solely by looking at the coefficients.
For the nonlinear model, I construct two sets of impulse responses. In the first case,
the economy is assumed to remain in a given state forever. Because the model is linear
within a state, the impulse response functions can be obtained by using the estimated
VAR coefficients for the given regime. In the second case, the state of the economy is
allowed to evolve because the threshold variable itself responds to government spending
shocks. When the system is allowed to evolve and switch between regimes, the impulse
response function depends on the initial state and possibly on the size and the sign of
the shock. Following Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996), I consider generalized impulse
response functions (GIRFs) in order to obtain the responses when the threshold variable
is allowed to respond endogenously. The impulse responses are defined as the change in
conditional expectation of Yt+k as a result of a shock at time t:
E[Yt+k|shockt,Ψt−1]− E[Yt+k|Ψt−1] (13)
where Ψt−1 is the information set at time t-1. Calculating the GIRFs requires specifying
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the nature of the shock and the initial conditions Ψt−1, and then the conditional ex-
pectations E[Yt+k|shockt,Ψt−1] and E[Yt+k|Ψt−1] are computed by simulating the model.
Similar to Kilian and Vigfusson (2011), I consider an orthogonal exogenous shock iden-
tified from the SVAR model rather than a forecast error from the reduced-form VAR, as
was considered in Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996).
In practice, the simulation-based structural IRFs are computed as follows (a detailed
version of the algorithm is presented in the Appendix): First, shocks for periods 0 to
20 are simulated using the estimated variance-covariance matrix for the threshold SVAR
model and, for given initial values of the variables, fed through the estimated model to
produce a simulated data series. The result is a forecast of the variables conditional on
initial values and a particular sequence of shocks. Next, the same procedure is repeated
with the same initial values and shocks, except that the shock to government spending
in period 0 is fixed at 1 percent of GDP (for that particular starting value of GDP).
The shocks are fed though the model and a forecast is produced just as above. The
difference between this forecast and the baseline forecast is the impulse response function
for a particular sequence of shocks and initial values. This computation is repeated for
five hundred draws of the shocks and averaged to produce impulse response functions
conditional only on a particular history. These IRFs are then averaged over a particular
subset of initial values.
Because threshold models imply that the predicted responses from the model to a shock
depend on a particular history, I first simulate the responses for the evolving model, av-
eraging over all histories when the threshold variable is above the estimated threshold
and averaging over states when it is below. Then I compare those results to those ob-
tained when the GIRFs are simulated for the recent histories between 1984-2011 when the
threshold is above the threshold and when it is below, including the“New Economy”rapid
expansion in the late 1990s and the “Great Recession” in the late 2000s. To capture the
uncertainty about the parameter values, the credibility intervals for the impulse response
functions are obtained by simulating the IRFs for all iterations of the MH algorithm.
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2.4. Empirical Results
2.4.1. Model Comparisons
As discussed in Section 2.3, the formal model comparisons are based on marginal
likelihoods and the implied Bayes factors. Table 11 reports marginal likelihood values for
the baseline model with different threshold variables, including the restricted case of no
threshold effect. Despite relatively diffuse priors on parameters, which should penalize
more highly-parameterized models, the implied Bayes factors strongly favor nonlinearity
when considering threshold variables related to economic slack. There is also support
for nonlinearity when the threshold variable is lagged output growth, as considered in
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) and Mittnik and Semmler (2012), although neither
of those studies formally tested for nonlinearity. By contrast, there is no support for
nonlinearity when considering the debt-to-GDP ratio or the real interest rate. For the
debt-to-GDP ratio, the estimated threshold is near the boundary of the parameter space
considered, so the lack of support for nonlinearity in this case might reflect the relatively
low levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio in U.S. economy since 1967, at least compared to
the levels observed in other countries that have suffered debt crises. For the real interest
rate, the estimated threshold is about 2 percent, which is often thought to be close to
the long-run “neutral” rate. However, this estimate is quite imprecise, consistent with the
lack of support for a threshold effect relating to the interest rate.
Based on the marginal likelihood results in Table 11, the preferred threshold variable
for the baseline model is the first lag of capacity utilization (adjusted for a one-time
structural break in the mean, as discussed in Section 2.3). The estimated threshold for
the baseline model is slightly below the mean of the adjusted capacity utilization series.20
The mean-adjusted capacity utilization series and its estimated threshold are plotted
in Figure 10. The high-utilization regime dates estimated with capacity utilization as
the threshold variable largely coincide with the high-utilization regime dates found when
20The sample mean for unadjusted capacity utilization is 85.2 for 1967Q1-1974Q1 and 80.0 for 1974Q2-
2011Q1.
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using the CBO’s output gap estimate as a measure of slack and with the regime dates
obtained when using output or unemployment as measures of slack.
Notably, more than 60% of the historical observations for mean-adjusted capacity uti-
lization fall below the mode of posterior distribution for the threshold parameter, while
close to 50% fall below the posterior mean. This result is important because it implies
that, for a majority of the time since the middle 1960s, the U.S. economy has operated
in a regime in which government spending shocks have relatively large effects on output.
Since 2000, almost all observations have been in the low regime. A possible interpretation
of these results is that demand, not supply, has been the proximate constraint on aggre-
gate output for much of the sample period. This result also distinguishes the approach
used here from Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a), as their approach imposes that
only 20% of the observations fall in a recessionary regime.
Although the marginal likelihood results in Table 11 strongly favor nonlinearity, it is
important to address Sims’ (2001) concern that evidence for time-varying parameters in
VAR models may be the spurious result of failing to fully account for heteroskedasticity.
Therefore, I consider some diagnostic tests for the preferred baseline model with mean-
adjusted capacity utilization. The model allows for some heteroskedasticity given that it
incorporates a one-time structural break in the scale of the variance-covariance matrix
for the VAR residuals corresponding to the Great Moderation in 1984Q1. For this model,
the standardized residuals based on the parameter values at the posterior mean pass the
Jarque-Bera test for Normality of the individual residual series and the Doornik-Hansen
test statistic for multivariate Normality is 10.54 (p-value 0.23). Also, there is no evidence
of serial correlation in the standardized residuals based on Ljung-Box Q-tests and the
ARCH-LM test does not reject the null of a constant variances for the individual residual
series. Thus, the evidence for nonlinearity does not appear to be an artifact of failing
to fully account for heteroskedasticity. Instead, it appears that any heteroskedasticity
is successfully captured by allowing for a structural break in the scale of the variance-
covariance matrix for the VAR residuals.
When I estimate the effects of government spending on output components and other
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variables, I substitute the outcome variable of interest (i.e., consumption, investment,
exports, imports, the unemployment rate, employment, and inflation) for output in the
baseline VAR model, using the first lag of mean-adjusted capacity utilization as the
threshold variable.21 As with the baseline model, I find strong evidence of nonlinear-
ity for these models. Table 3 reports the marginal likelihood values (and the modes of
the likelihood) for linear and nonlinear specifications of these alternative VAR models.
In every case, the nonlinear specification is preferred. In particular, the implied Bayes
factors always prefer the nonlinear specification, with posterior odds only favoring lin-
ear specifications under extremely high prior odds of more than 10 to 1 on the linear
specifications. Again, the strong evidence for nonlinearity is particularly notable given
relatively diffuse priors on parameters. Meanwhile, Table 13 also reports the estimated
thresholds in mean-adjusted capacity utilization for these alternative VAR models and
shows that they are quite consistent across the different models.
2.4.2. Responses of Output to a Government Spending Shock
As discussed above, the government spending shocks in the SVAR model is identified
by assuming output and its private-sector components can respond to government spend-
ing within a quarter, but government spending does not respond to output within the
same quarter. The results are similar when considering alternative identification schemes:
specifically, I obtain almost identical results when I reorder taxes and government spend-
ing so that spending can respond to tax shocks, when I use Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002)
identification scheme that imposes short-run tax elasticities, and when adding Ramey’s
narrative spending variable and order it first so that the rest of government spending can
respond to military spending within a quarter.22
21In preliminary analysis, I also considered these effects by adding each series as a fifth variable to the
baseline model. The point estimates for the threshold and the median impulse responses were very
similar for both specifications, but the 95% (and even the 75%) credibility intervals were very wide
in the specification with five variables because there are too few observations per regime to precisely
estimate a threshold VAR with so many variables without imposing very tight priors. Thus, the
results presented in the rest of this chapter are based on four-variable versions of the VAR model.
22Owyang and Zubairy (2013) also find impulse response functions for SVAR models are broadly robust
when considering different identification schemes, including sign restrictions. They consider a linear
VAR model that includes U.S. state-level data and separates out military spending, as in Ramey
(2011b).
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When constructing the impulse response functions to government spending, the initial
shock to government spending is set to be equal to 1 percent of GDP. The shock to govern-
ment spending initiates a dynamic path of adjustment for both government spending and
other variables of interest. To make the interpretation of the results more straightforward
and to facilitate comparison with the linear results obtained by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), the dynamic multipliers are calculated as ratios of the cumulative dollar-for-dollar
change in the variable of interest to the cumulative dollar-for-dollar change in government
spending. Meanwhile, when I examine the behavior of employment, unemployment, and
inflation, the responses are presented as level responses to a shock to government spending
equal to 1 percent of GDP.
The primary results appear in Figure 11. The top row of the figure shows the impulse
responses of output to a government spending shock for the two regimes, in both cases
assuming that the economy remains in the same state forever. The response of output
to spending shocks depends strongly on the regime. The shock to government spending
pushes output up immediately in both the high and the low utilization regimes. However,
in the low regime, output rises almost monotonically to a cumulative change in output
equal to 1.6 times the cumulative change in government spending. Most of the effect takes
place in the first three years. In the high-utilization regime, the pattern is substantially
different. After the initial positive response, the cumulative change in output falls back
towards zero. The long-term response is positive, but the multiplier is less than half of
that when output is in the low-utilization regime.
When the economy is allowed to evolve from one state to another, the magnitude of
the multiplier varies depending both on the state of the economy at the time of the
government spending shock and on the actual history of other shocks. As shown in the
bottom two rows of Figure 11, the output response for all low states peaks at 1.6 after
two years and then the effects of the spending shock die out. The lower bound of the
credibility interval for the low-regime impulse response is strongly positive, despite the
fact that I use a fairly conservative 90% credibility interval. In comparison, the average
response for all high states peaks at 0.8 after two years, and then it remains stable, but
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the credibility interval always covers zero.
Thus, the estimates clearly suggest that the effects of government spending on output
are larger and more persistent when capacity utilization is low. In the following sub-
sections, I examine the source of this result about the asymmetric response of output
to fiscal policy shocks in more detail. In particular, I look at the responses of output
components in order to determine whether the asymmetry comes from an asymmetry in
the response of fiscal variables to the government spending shock or if it is due to an
asymmetric response in the components of private spending.
2.4.3. Responses of Fiscal Policy to a Government Spending Shock
From Figure 12, it is clear that the response of government spending to its own shock
does not depend very strongly on the prevailing regime. In this case, the IRFs are shown
as cumulative dollar-for-dollar changes in government spending relative to the size of
the initial shock, because the ratio of government spending to itself is necessarily equal
to one. For both regimes, the peak cumulative dollar-for-dollar change is roughly 1.3,
which is consistent with the results obtained in the linear case by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and similar to the results obtained by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a). Both
the credibility intervals for the regimes overlap and the actual estimated responses are
similar across regimes. The similar responses across regimes clearly indicate then that
the asymmetric response of output is not due to higher or more persistent government
spending in the low-utilization regime.
Figure 13 shows that the peak response of tax revenues to a government spending shock
is roughly 0.8 in evolving regimes, with little effect of the initial state of the economy.
In the fixed low-utilization regime, tax revenues appear to increase persistently after
a government spending shock, while the response of tax revenues is smaller and dies
off quickly when the economy starts and remains in the high regime. But, given the
wide credibility intervals for the responses at long horizons, there is no obvious evidence
of an asymmetry in the response of tax revenues that could explain the asymmetry in
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the response of output to a government spending shock.23 Thus, the asymmetry in the
response of output to a fiscal policy shock appears be due to an asymmetry in the response
of private spending, not the government sector of the economy.
2.4.4. Responses of Consumption and Investment to a Government Spending
Shock
Figure 14 displays the responses of consumption to a government spending shock. The
main result is that consumption increases in both regimes, but the magnitude of the
response is much larger when the economy is in the low-utilization regime.24 When start-
ing from a low-utilization state, but allowing the state to evolve, the long-run response
levels off after three years at close to 0.8, averaging over all histories (the effect is even
larger when averaged over recent histories). Consumption is much less responsive when
the economy starts in a high-utilization state. The peak response in this case is only
around 0.4, and becomes insignificant after a year. Thus, it appears that the asymmetric
response of output to government spending is at least partly due to an asymmetry in
the magnitude of the response of consumption. Meanwhile, the findings of a positive
response of consumption in both regimes is consistent with the linear results obtained
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Pappa (2009), and Woodford (2011). Also, accounting
for anticipated government spending by including Ramey’s military spending variable
and ordering it first in the linear or nonlinear versions of the SVAR does not change the
response or the significance of the response in either case.
Figure 15 displays the responses of investment, which also appear to be asymmetric
depending on the state of the economy. In the fixed low regime, investment increases in
response to government spending, with a peak response of 0.4, although the credibility
23It is important to note that these results are for the responses of tax revenues, not tax rates. Tax
revenues are correlated with income, so part of the increase in revenues comes from increases in
income due to the positive government spending shock, indicating that spending could be partially
self-financing (although further analysis would be necessary to examine this possibility given the
wide credibility intervals). Another part of the increase in revenues could come from the endogenous
response of tax rates to a government spending shock. The use of tax revenues also makes it difficult
to interpret the responses of output and its components to changes in taxes because individuals and
firms respond to marginal tax rates. Unfortunately, though, reliable data for marginal tax rates are
only available at an annual frequency.
24This result is robust to considering consumption of nondurables and services only.
55
interval includes zero. When the economy is assumed to remain in the high-utilization
state forever, investment drops significantly in response to a spending shock, with a
cumulative decline equal to 0.9 after five years. Allowing the economy to evolve from one
regime to another, the responses of investment are weakly positive when the economy
starts from a low-utilization state and not different from from zero when the economy
starts from a high-utilization state. These results indicate the relevance of crowding out in
the high-utilization state, but provide no support for crowding out in the low-utilization
state. Furthermore, these results may help explain the “investment puzzle” in linear
studies such as Blanchard and Perotti (2002) because the negative response in the linear
VAR is roughly a weighted average of the responses in the nonlinear model. Specifically,
the apparent neoclassical behavior of investment found in these studies appears to reflect
crowding out when capacity utilization is high only.
Overall, the strong state-dependence in the responses of consumption and investment
suggests that a lot of the asymmetry in the response of output is due to different responses
of these key components to government spending depending on the degree of resource
utilization.
2.4.5. Responses of Other Macroeconomic Variables to a Government Spending
Shock
Figure 16 displays the fixed-regime responses of exports and imports, which are very
similar across regimes. Both exports and imports weakly increase, and the increase in
exports roughly cancels out the increase in imports. Furthermore, the credibility inter-
vals for the state-dependent responses overlap, suggesting little support for asymmetric
responses of imports and exports to government spending. For brevity, I do not report
responses when allowing the state of the economy to evolve, although not surprisingly
given these results for the fixed regimes, those responses display very little asymmetry.
Figure 17 shows that the unemployment rate decreases in response to a spending shock
in both states. In the low-utilization regime, the unemployment rate decreases monoton-
ically, falling by a total of 2.5 percentage points after five years. The effect of a spending
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shock on the unemployment rate is weaker and less persistent when the economy is in
the high-utilization regime. The impact response is essentially zero, and the maximum
response (in magnitude) is a 1.3 percentage point decline. When analyzing the magni-
tude of the responses, it is important to keep in mind that the impulse responses were
constructed using a relatively large spending shock (1 percent of the GDP), which might
explain the large responses of the unemployment rate.
The responses of employment also exhibits state-dependence that is consistent with
the responses of the unemployment rate. In Figure 18, when the economy is in a low-
utilization state, employment increases by 1 percent after two years, and the long run
response is equal to 0.8 percent. When the economy starts from a high-utilization state,
the effect of a government spending shock on employment is only slightly positive and
transitory. The credibility intervals for employment, however, are quite wide, and zero
effects are not outside the 90% interval for either regime. This result is due to the fact
that I use a conservative 90% interval and the fact that employment only builds up slowly
after the shock. In particular, the estimated employment effects are only large at longer
horizons, while credibility intervals are always wide at longer horizons for SVAR models.
Figure 19 displays the responses of the real interest rate and inflation. In the fixed
low regime, there is little response of either variable. Thus, monetary policy appears
to accommodate fiscal policy when capacity utilization is low, with little implication
for inflation (perhaps due to a convex Phillips curve). Notably, this accomodation of
fiscal policy does not just occur in a zero-lower-bound environment (see Christiano et al.
2011, and Woodford, 2011), but is the apparent response of monetary policy whenever
the economy is in the low-utilization state.25In the fixed high regime, an increase in
government spending has a more persistent effect on inflation and triggers a delayed, but
large response of the interest rate. The estimated responses are consistent with the idea
25It is also notable that the real interest does not appear to be an important variable in linear SVAR
models of fiscal policy (e.g., it is absent from Blanchard and Perotti’s, 2002, model) or as a threshold
variable in a nonlinear model (see our results in Table 2). The implication is that the different
responses of monetary policy are primarily determined by the state of the economy as captured by
capacity utilization regimes, not by other factors such as a binding zero nominal lower bound (which,
of course, only occurs near the end of the sample period) that might influence the behavior of real
interest rates.
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that government spending can crowd out resource use, thus increasing marginal costs
when the economy is close to capacity, but monetary policy responds to keep inflation
under control. The response of the interest rate in the high-utilization state is large both
economically and statistically, but the credibility intervals for the responses of inflation
in both regimes are quite wide (due to the VAR polynomial having a unit root relatively
close to one). For brevity, the responses in the evolving regimes are not displayed, as
they are very similar.
2.4.6. Counterfactual Analysis
One of the main criticisms of the ARRA fiscal stimulus is that output growth remained
anemic two years after it was first implemented and that the unemployment rate remained
persistently high. However, in order to fully evaluate whether the stimulus had any effect
on the economy, it is important to compare what output and the unemployment rate
would have been if there had been no stimulus in the first place. Taking into account
that in the months before the stimulus package was implemented, interest rates were
already approaching the zero bound and that employment was dropping precipitously,
the absence of fiscal stimulus could have resulted in even lower output growth and the
unemployment rate rising even higher than its 10.1 percent peak.
In order to evaluate the effects of the stimulus, I make use of the preferred model to
perform counterfactual analysis for the period 2009-2010 in which I compare the implied
path of output and employment without increases in government spending to the actual
path of output and spending. This is done this by orthogonalizing the shocks for each
period and setting the orthogonalized government spending shocks equal to zero for the
period 2009-2010.26 Figure 20 displays the results of the counterfactual experiments. If
I set the spending shocks between 2009 and 2010 equal to zero, the economy would have
needed one more quarter to recover (i.e., the simulated output growth would not have
26Taylor (2011) notes that the overall impact of the ARRA stimulus on government spending was not
as large as advertised because state and local government saved a large portion of their stimulus
grants. Thus, the implied effects on output and employment reported below should not be thought
of in terms of a one-time exogenous $700 billion dollar increase in federal government spending, but
rather in terms of the much smaller exogenous changes in total government spending over the period
under consideration.
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become positive until 2009Q3) and the recovery would have been even more sluggish,
with the maximum simulated growth rate reaching 0.4 percent at the end of 2009 and
then dropping down to zero by the end of 2010.
The results for unemployment are similar. Without fiscal stimulus, the simulated es-
timate for the unemployment level is 0.7 percentage points higher in 2010Q2 than what
the actual unemployment rate turned out to be. Furthermore, without the spending
shocks the unemployment rate would have stayed higher (around 10.3 percent), without
dropping below double digits at any point. Interestingly, the results based on the coun-
terfactual analysis are similar to the CBO estimates for the effects of the ARRA stimulus
and support the idea that, even if employment and output growth did not reach the high
rates that are typical for a recovery, the fiscal stimulus was helpful in the sense that it
prevented the recession from becoming deeper and longer.
2.5. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have presented strong empirical evidence in favor of state-dependent
effects of fiscal policy. In particular, the estimates from a threshold structural vector
autoregressive model clearly identify different responses of the economy to government
spending shocks depending on whether the economy has high or low utilization of eco-
nomic resources. I find that a rise in demand from the government sector causes large
and persistently positive effects on output when the economy is operating with relatively
low capacity utilization. This effect is much smaller and less persistent when capacity
utilization is above an estimated threshold for the model.
It is particularly interesting to note that the estimated threshold for capacity utilization
is such that a majority of observations for the U.S. economy over the past 40 years appear
to have been in the low-utilization regime in which demand shocks have larger and more
persistent effects, with any constraints from the supply side binding less tightly. This
result implies that the normal state for the U.S. economy is one of significant excess
capacity. Therefore, the proximate effect of a demand shock is more likely than not to
be positive and persistent.
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There is no empirical evidence that higher government spending crowds out consump-
tion. Indeed, consumption rises after positive government spending shocks in both the
high- and low-utilization regimes, but the increase is almost twice as large during “nor-
mal” times (i.e., low utilization) than during “booms” (i.e., high utilization). Most of the
increase in the private components of output comes from the increase in consumption.
These results for consumption are consistent with the linear results obtained by Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2008) and Pappa (2009), but are at odds with the
simulation results obtained using most calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models. Only when allowing for a high proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers
do Gal´ı et al (2007) find such large responses of consumption in an estimated (not cal-
ibrated) DSGE model. Meanwhile, the state-dependent responses of consumption are
potentially related to the results obtained by Kaplan and Violante (2012), who develop
a life-cycle model that endogenizes the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers in order
to examine the effect of taxes on consumption when a large proportion of the consumers’
wealth is tied up in illiquid assets such as real estate. Historically, the number of credit-
constrained consumers rises in recessions, and the Great Recession started with the crash
of the housing market, which likely implied a large increase in the proportion of credit-
constrained consumers in its aftermath. Even more directly along these lines, Canzoneri
et al. (2012) calibrate a New Keynesian DSGE model with costly financial intermediation
and show that countercyclical shocks to the spread between rates paid by borrowers and
received by depositors implies countercyclical fiscal multipliers, although this is a fairly
mechanical result given the assumptions of countercyclical spread shocks and the ability
of government spending shocks to disproportionately lower borrowing costs when the level
of output is lower.
In terms of investment, we also find little evidence of crowding out in the low regime.
However, investment does fall in the high-utilization regime in response to higher gov-
ernment spending. This finding is consistent with our results for real interest rates.
Specifically, interest rates do not appear to respond to government spending in the low
regime, but they rise strongly with government spending when resource constraints are
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tight. A possible explanation for these results is that monetary policy is much more
accommodative of fiscal stimulus when there is a large degree of economic slack and lit-
tle pressure on inflation, with the degree of monetary accommodation determining the
output multiplier, as suggested by Woodford (2011).
Regardless of the exact mechanism behind the state-dependent effects of fiscal pol-
icy, the implications for policy are straightforward and significant. Higher government
spending raises output, but this effect is both larger and more persistent when capacity
utilization is low. At these times, including during recessions, higher government spend-
ing reduces economic slack and increases output, consumption, and investment. Although
stimulus policy to reduce slack may increase government debt, the effect is smaller than
a simple calculation would suggest because higher government spending raises output,
income, and therefore tax revenue, and the effect of spending stimulus on public debt is
less than dollar for dollar.
Further extensions of this work will explore policy implications more deeply. In par-
ticular, because the “low-utilization” regime prevails in at least half of the sample period,
it would be interesting to consider whether allowing a third regime would identify re-
cession effects when stimulus policy might be even more effective. Also, beyond the
state-dependent nonlinearities found here, there may be additional asymmetries in the
response of output to the size and sign of changes in fiscal policy. Finally, I have made
preliminary analysis of tax shocks and found some comparable results to those for gov-
ernment spending shocks. But identifying tax shocks is challenging due to a lack of
availability of quarterly data on tax rates instead of tax revenues, for which movements
are largely endogenous (see, for example, the May 2012 issue of the American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy for a number of studies illustrating the challenges in identi-
fying the effects of tax shocks, even within a linear framework). Thus,a more complete
analysis of possible state-dependent effects of tax shocks is left for future research.
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3. The Asymmetric Effects of Fiscal Stimulus and
Austerity Across the Business Cycle
3.1. Introduction
The world-wide Great Recession, the implementation of fiscal stimulus packages intended
to ameliorate the recession, and the subsequent austerity measures led to renewed inter-
est, both academic and political, about the stabilization role of discretionary fiscal policy.
Some of the key questions that have arisen during the past few years are whether govern-
ment spending has significant effects on aggregate output and components of output at
all, and whether there is evidence of sign and size asymmetry in the responses of output
and output components over the business cycle. These two questions are closely related,
but distinct, especially when it comes to designing fiscal policy.
The first question is whether there is any evidence in favor of implementing a stimulus
or cuts at all. Many studies find large fiscal multipliers that support positive effects
of fiscal expansions and negative effects of austerity on output (see Ramey, 2011, for
a recent survey). A more nuanced case for the appropriate timing of fiscal expansions
comes from recent evidence that the effects of fiscal policy depend on the state of the
economy. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a,b), Mittnik and Semmler (2012), and
Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska (2013), find that government spending multipliers, on
average, are larger during periods of macroeconomic slack. These results support the
recommendation for using fiscal stimulus to increase output in times of recession or, in
general, in times when the economy is below full capacity. Conditional on the existence of
state dependence, the second question helps us determine the optimal size and timing for
a stimulus and the optimal time and size for an austerity measure. For example, if there is
evidence that a larger stimulus is more effective, dollar-for-dollar, than a small stimulus
in times of recession, then it would be optimal to implement a single large stimulus
package rather sequence of smaller measures. Similarly, evidence that austerity measures
have a much smaller negative impact on output during robust recoveries than during
weak recoveries suggest that “fiscal consolidation” has lower economic cost if implemented
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in good times. In this chapter, I address the second question and examine whether
there is evidence that large increases in discretionary government spending affect output
and output components differently than small changes, and whether cuts in government
spending have effects that are different in magnitude than an increase of the same size.
In this chapter, I extend the literature on fiscal spending in two ways. First, I introduce
an impulse-response based approach that allows me to formally compare the responses
of output to a positive spending shock across states of the economy, and to cuts and
large shocks within a state. This method can be used to directly evaluate whether there
are state-dependent effects. Second, I examine whether there is evidence of sign and size
asymmetry within a given state. To investigate the possibility of sign and size asymmetries
within a given state, I build on the work of Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska (hereafter,
FMP1), and develop an impulse response cased comparison. The framework used in
FMP1 naturally lends itself to analyzing the impact of fiscal spending, because it allows
for state-dependent asymmetries, and for sign and size asymmetries within a given state.
For example, it allows for the possibility that the effects of a positive spending shock equal
to 1% of GDP to be different in normal times and in booms, and also for the possibility
that a 1% cut during a recession or a boom may not have effects that are the same in
magnitude as the effects of a 1% increase.
The impulse-response model comparison presented here corroborates the results ob-
tained using general model-based marginal likelihood comparison in FMP1. There is
strong evidence in favor of state-dependent nonlinearity; specifically, government spend-
ing shocks have larger effects on output when they occur with relatively low resource
utilization than when they appear at times of high resource use. We find that the re-
sponses of output and output components depend crucially on the state of the economy
when a policy shock occurs. Furthermore, when the economy is not resource constrained,
a large fiscal stimulus is more effective at increasing employment and output than a small
stimulus. In contrast when the economy is close to capacity, a large stimulus has Less
than proportional effects on output than a smaller stimulus. Consumption exhibits the
same asymmetric responses as output. A government spending cut crowds in investment
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more than an expansion crowds out investment in the constrained state. Higher gov-
ernment spending crowds in investment in the unconstrained state, but the response is
not significant, and there is no significant evidence of sign or size asymmetry. When the
economy is very close to capacity, fiscal cuts have larger effects on payroll employment
than fiscal expansions. The effects on private employment are smaller in magnitude, but
qualitatively similar to the effects of cuts and expansions on overall employment.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews, very briefly the
empirical literature that estimates fiscal multipliers. Section 3.3 introduces the baseline
empirical model and the estimation method. Section 3.4 presents the empirical results for
output and extends the baseline model to models that include consumption, investment,
and other variables of interest. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2. A Brief Review of Fiscal Multiplier Estimates
Before the Great Recession, most of the empirical research on fiscal policy employed
linear time series models in which the size of the response of output or other variables to
government spending is independent of the state of the economy, independent of the size
of the exogenous spending shock, and cuts and increases in spending have effects that are
exactly equal in magnitude, but the implication that the outcome of either stimulus or
austerity measures does not depend on the size or the timing of implementation is quite
restrictive. Furthermore, the size of the fiscal multipliers obtained from linear models
tends to depend crucially on the model and the assumption used.
Traditional Keynesian models keep the interest rate fixed over the whole forecasting
horizon, and the multipliers obtained from those models are often very large (always
greater than 1, sometimes as big as 4). Studies based on SVAR models in which govern-
ment spending is assumed to be predetermined typically find that output, consumption,
and real wages increase after a positive government spending shock. Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002) and Perotti (2008) find that the response of output and consumption to gov-
ernment spending is positive, large, and persistent, although, perhaps surprisingly, they
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find a negative response of investment. This discrepancy between the positive response
of consumption (implied by Keynesian models), and the negative response of investment
(implied by neoclassical models) is commonly referred to as the “investment puzzle” in
the fiscal policy literature. The magnitude of the estimated effects depends on the identi-
fication of the model. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2008) use institutional
information to identify the shocks, and they get government spending multipliers for out-
put that are about 1.3. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) use an alternative approach based
on sign restrictions, and they get a smaller government spending multiplier for output
of 0.5 and a multiplier for consumption that is positive, but very close to zero. Studies
that augment the linear VAR model with a measure of expected government spending or
with a narrative measure of military spending (EVARs) typically find much smaller and
less persistent output multipliers. For example, Ramey (2011b, 2012) finds that the peak
response of output to the narrative military spending variable is 1.2, and the response
of consumption is negative. Leeper et al. (2012) examine the variability of multipliers
for output and consumption in DSGE models in great detail, and they conclude that the
estimates are very sensitive to the specification of the model. The estimates for output
multipliers obtained vary very widely, from -4 to 4, based on the assumptions imposed
on the model parameters. Parker (2012) and Ramey (2011a) provide an extensive survey
of the results obtained from linear studies.
One of the reasons for the wide range of empirical estimates for the spending multiplier
is the possible existence of state-dependent effects. If the size of the multiplier depends
on the state of the economy, then a linear model would average over both high and
low responses, or possibly over positive and negative responses, leading both to wide
confidence intervals and to results that are very strongly affected by the sample period
used. Recently the focus shifted towards nonlinear models where the effects of fiscal
spending are allowed to vary over the business cycle. Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska
(2013), FMP1 hereafter, find that the effects of government spending depend very strongly
on the state of the business cycle. In particular, we estimate and formally compare
whether there are threshold effects and find that the effects of a spending shock are
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significantly larger during periods when the economy has underutilized resources. It
is important to note that 60% of the historical observations fall below the estimated
threshold. This result implies that, for a majority of the time since the middle 1960s,
the U.S. economy has operated in a regime in which government spending shocks have
relatively large effects on output. Since 2000, almost all observations have been in the
low regime. Auerbach and Gorodnichkenko (2012a,b) and Mittnik and Semmler (2012)
impose a threshold that splits the sample into NBER recessions and “normal times” and
they also find evidence in favor of state-dependent effects of government spending on
output, with output multiplier being close to 1.8 in times of recessions. Candelon and
Lieb (2012) extend the model used by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko by imposing long
run equilibrium conditions. They also find strong evidence of state-dependence, but
their output multiplers are smaller than those obtained by FMP1 and Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko. Baum and Koester (2011) find that there is strong evidence in favor
of state-dependent effects of state-dependent effects of fiscal policy in Germany, but the
multipliers are smaller than the estimated multipliers for the U.S. Bachmann and Sims
(2012) estimate a similar model to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) and find the
same result that spending shocks have large effects during recessions, but in their model
the larger effects operate largely through consumer confidence. Shoag (2013) obtains
much higher output multipliers for state level government spending during periods of
slack in the labor market than during normal periods (2.12 vs 1). Owyang, Ramey, and
Zubairy (2013) combine the approach used by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) and
Ramey (2011a) by imposing a threshold and augmenting the model with a narrative
measure of military spending. They find state-dependent effects for Canada, but no
evidence of state-dependence for the U.S.
Very few papers explored size and sign asymmetries. Baum and Koester (2011) com-
pare the response of output to a 2% positive shock, 5% positive shock, and 2% cut to
government spending for Germany. They find that large increases have proportionally
larger effects in recessions, and cuts have slightly smaller effects than increases in all
periods. The literature that uses U.S. has not investigated size or sign asymmetries.
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3.3. Empirical Methods
3.3.1. Model
Before introducing the impulse-response-based comparison of multipliers, I start by re-
viewing the model used in FMP1. This model can be used both to assess if there is any
evidence of state-dependence in the average response of output over the business cycle,
and whether there is evidence of sign and size asymmetry. The basic vector autoregression
(VAR) model is linear, and cannot capture nonlinear dynamics such as regime switching
and asymmetric responses to shocks. I consider a nonlinear version of a VAR model that
extends the threshold autoregressive model of Tong (1978, 1983) to a multivariate setting.
I specify a threshold version of a reduced-form VAR model as follows:
Yt = Φ
1
0
+ Φ1
1
(L)Yt−1 + (Φ20 + Φ
2
1
(L)Yt−1)I[qt−d > γ] + εt (14)
where Yt is a vector containing the first difference of the logarithm of real government
spending, the first difference of the logarithm of net taxes, the first difference of the
logarithm of real GDP, and a mean-adjusted measure of capacity utilization. This is
the baseline version of the model. In the following subsection I also consider alternative
versions of the model that incorporate the private-sector components of output (i.e.,
consumption and investment) and labor market variables.
The lag polynomial matrices Φ11(L) and Φ
2
1(L) capture the dynamics of the system. The
disturbances εt are assumed to be independent and Gaussian with mean zero. Rather
than assuming that the disturbances are strictly i.i.d., I set the covariance matrix of εt
equal to Ω until 1984Q1 and equal to λΩ afterwards to capture the Great Moderation.
As elaborated in Chapter 2 and in FMP1, the break date is set exogenously. By using a
scale factor λ and a constant variance-covariance matrix Ω, I am also assuming that the
correlations between the endogenous variables do not change over time or over regimes.
The threshold variable qt−d determines the prevailing regime; γ is the threshold parame-
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ter at which the regime switch occurs. The indicator function I[·] equals 1 when the qt−d
exceeds the threshold γ and 0 otherwise. The integer d is the delay lag for the threshold
switch; that is, if the threshold variable qt−d crosses γ at time t−d, the dynamics actually
change at time t.
3.3.2. Data
Government spending and net taxes are defined as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The
full sample period is 1967Q1-2012Q3. All output components are measured in real terms
and are seasonally adjusted by the source. The series for output, its components, including
government spending, and tax revenues were obtained from NIPA-BEA, and the capacity
utilization series was obtained from the Federal Reserve Statistical Releases website. I
also consider non-farm payroll employment and employment in the private sector, both
of which were all obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED website.
The monthly series for capacity utilization and both employment series are all converted
to a quarterly frequency by using simple arithmetic means.
I use growth rates rather than log-levels in the VAR because the logarithms of real
GDP and output components exhibit nonstationarity. Johansen cointegration tests sug-
gest the absence of cointegrating relationship between government spending and taxes,
between government spending, taxes, and output, as well as between government spend-
ing, taxes, and output components (consumption, investment, employment, and private
employment).
3.3.3. Specification Issues and Using Capacity Utilization as a Measure of Slack
The lag length for the VAR model is chosen based on AIC (for the baseline linear VAR
model, estimated using maximum likelihood as a starting point). Both AIC and SIC
select four lags, which is also the number of lags used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
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Ramey (2011b), and most other studies that use the linear SVAR approach.
To solve for the SVAR given the reduced-form VAR parameters, I impose the same
short-run zero restrictions used in the previous chapter: government spending is ordered
first and taxes are ordered second in all models; i.e., government spending is assumed to
respond to economic conditions only with a lag, but economic conditions are allowed to
respond immediately to government spending.
I use capacity utilization as the threshold variable for three important reasons. First,
it is a natural proxy for the level of utilization of resources. Second, FMP1 consider a
large set of threshold variables, and we show that the preferred threshold variable for the
baseline model is the first lag of capacity utilization, adjusted for a one-time structural
break in mean (see Tables 10, 11, and 12 for details). Last, as shown in Figures 9 and
21 in the appendix and in Figure 1 in FMP1, the mean-adjusted capacity utilization
series is strongly correlated with other commonly-used measures of economic activity,
and it is highly correlated with the asymmetric measure of the business cycle based on
a model-averaged forecast-based trend/cycle decomposition, so it appears to be a highly
representative measure of economic slack.
3.3.4. Estimation and Inference
I make inferences about the threshold and the coefficients using Bayesian methods; in
particular, I use a multi-block Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm described in detail
in FMP1 to sample from marginal posterior distributions for parameters and calculate
marginal likelihoods for models. An advantage of using a Bayesian approach in this frame-
work is that it allows us to directly capture the parameter uncertainty when comparing
the impulse responses. The estimated threshold for the baseline model is -0.21, slightly
below the mean of the adjusted capacity utilization series.
There are two ways to compare whether the effects of government spending differ
across regimes in this framework. First, we can evaluate if the model exhibits state
dependence by using model comparison. Second, we can explore state dependence, and
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size or sign asymmetry by directly comparing impulse responses. In FMP1 we use the
model comparison approach. In particular, we estimate the threshold VAR model using
the MH algorithm and then we compare its marginal likelihood to that for a restricted
linear version of the VAR model, specified as follows:
Yt = Φ
0
0
+ Φ01(L)Yt−1 + εt (15)
The marginal likelihoods are calculated using Chib and Jeliazkov’s (2001) algorithm and
we compare models based on Bayes factors, which are the ratio of marginal likelihoods
and are equal to posterior odds ratios under even prior odds (i.e., equal prior probabilities
on all models under consideration). The model comparison approach indicated that there
is strong evidence in favor of non-linearity.
A disadvantage of the model comparison approach is that can only discern whether
the coefficients are different across regimes, but it does not disentangle the sources of the
nonlinearity, and it does not provide a formal comparison of the responses to positive and
negative shocks, nor of the responses to shocks of different size. Rejecting nonlinearity
using model comparison implies that at least one of the impulse responses to at least
one of the structural shocks is necessarily different across regimes, but the degree of this
asymmetry can only be evaluated by looking at the impulse response functions. This
approach is better suited for examining the question at hand for two reasons. First, the
impulse responses give us the magnitude of the response of output and its components
to any kind of government spending shock for any history of interest, so they can be
used both to define the multiplier in the usual sense and to examine the response to
cuts and to increases of different sizes. Second, when it comes to designing policies, the
response of output is much more important than the coefficient estimates, and policy
makers are usually more concerned with the response of output or a variable of interest
conditional on current economic conditions, rather than with the average response. The
IRF comparison approach allows us to construct both average responses, and precisely
estimated conditional responses.
To construct the impulse responses when the threshold variable is allowed to respond
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endogenously, I consider generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs). A GIRF is
defined as the change in the conditional expectation of Yt+k as a result of a shock at time
t:
GIRF [shockt,Ψt−1] = E[Yt+k|shockt,Ψt−1]− E[Yt+k|Ψt−1] (16)
where Ψt−1 is the information set at time t-1. Calculating the GIRFs requires specifying
the nature of the shock and the initial conditions Ψt−1, and then the conditional ex-
pectations E[Yt+k|shockt,Ψt−1] and E[Yt+k|Ψt−1] are computed by simulating the model.
Similar to Kilian and Vigfusson (2011), and FMP1, I consider an orthogonal exogenous
shock identified from the SVAR model rather than a forecast error from the reduced-form
VAR, as considered in Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996). A detailed version of the al-
gorithm used to compute the impulse responses is presented in the appendix. Because
threshold models imply that the predicted responses from the model to a shock depend on
a particular history, I can simulate the responses for the evolving model for a particular
history of interest, or averaging over all histories when the threshold variable is above or
below the estimated threshold. To capture the uncertainty about the parameter values,
the credibility intervals for the impulse response functions are obtained by simulating the
GIRFs for all iterations of the MH algorithm. As discussed in detail in the Appendix,
in addition to producing a measure of the multiplier for any kind of spending shock that
directly accounts for parameter uncertainty, this approach allows me to compare the im-
pulse responses across states or the responses to different kinds of spending shocks by
looking at the posterior of the distribution of the difference
∆GIRF [shock1t1 , shock2t2 ,Ψt1−1,Ψt2−1] = (17)
= GIRF [shockt1 ,Ψt1−1]−GIRF [shockt2 ,Ψt2−1].
I can evaluate if the difference between the response is significant simply by checking
if zero is within a given quantile of the posterior. This approach is similar in spirit to the
75
approach used by Kilian and Vigffuson (2011), who test for size and sign asymmetry in
a frequentist setting by looking at the distribution of the impulse responses, but slightly
more general, because it allows both for state-dependence and for sign and size asymmetry
within a state. It is also more general than Jorda’s (2005) approach used by Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012b) and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), because it allows
for state-dependency, sign and size asymmetry, and parameter uncertainty.
3.4. Empirical Results
3.4.1. State-Dependence: Are the Average Responses Different?
In order to formally compare if the response of output is different in times of slacks than
in times of high utilization, I construct the average impulse response for all low states and
for all high states, and look at the posterior distribution for the difference in the impulse
responses.
As shown in Figure 22, when the shock to government spending is fixed to equal 1% of
GDP in both states, the difference between the mode of the average response in the low
state and the mode of the average response in the high state peaks at 0.8, and the 90%
credibility interval does not include zero during the first two years. When using less con-
servative 68% credibility intervals, common in the fiscal literature, the credibility interval
includes zero only after 12 quarters. The results for the average responses corroborate
the results obtained using the formal posterior likelihood comparison and the informal
impulse response comparison in FMP1. During periods of slack, the average response
of output to a spending shock peaks at 1.6. When the economy is close to being con-
strained with capacity utilization above the threshold, the average response is 0.8. The
new result here is that the difference in the responses is significant, implying that even
when accounting for parameter uncertainty, the average response in the low utilization
state is larger, both statistically and economically, than the average response in the high
utilization state.
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The results are similar when I consider alternative identification schemes: specifically,
I obtain almost identical results when we taxes and government spending are reorderedso
that spending can respond to tax shocks, when using Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002)
identification scheme that imposes short-run tax elasticities, when adding Ramey’s nar-
rative spending variable and order it first so that the rest of government spending can
respond to military spending within a quarter, and when we using Barro and Redlick’s
(2011) marginal tax rate, interpolated to quarterly frequency.
3.4.2. Output: Size and Sign Asymmetry within a State
As discussed above, I identify government spending shocks in the SVAR model by as-
suming output and its private-sector components can respond to government spending
within a quarter, but government spending does not respond to output within the same
quarter.
When constructing the impulse response functions to government spending, the initial
shock to government spending is set to equal 1 percent of GDP. The shock to government
spending initiates a dynamic path of adjustment for both government spending and other
variables of interest. To make the interpretation of the results more straightforward and
to facilitate comparison with the linear results obtained by Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
I calculate the dynamic multipliers as ratios of the cumulative dollar-for-dollar change in
the variable of interest to the cumulative dollar-for-dollar change in government spending.
To account for the fact that the ratio Gt/Yt changes over time and may not be appropriate
for evaluating the average responses, as pointed by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013),
we use Gt/Yt at each point in time. In order to assess whether there are any size and sign
asymmetries within a state, I focus on two histories of particular interest and compare
the responses within a state, and across those two histories. The first history Iconsider
is the last quarter of 1995, and the second history we consider is the second quarter of
2008. As shown in Figure 21, the mid-late 1990s was a period of rapid growth, when all
commonly used measure of economic slack were above their historic averages. The middle
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of the Great Recession was a time when capacity was below its average, and there was a
significant level of slack. Even when accounting for uncertainty in the estimation of the
threshold, the first period is above the threshold, and the second chosen history always
falls below the estimated threshold, so the responses conditional on these histories have
a clear interpretation as responses in the “constrained” state and in the “unconstrained”
state.
The primary results appear in Figures 23 and 24. When the economy is far below
capacity, as captured by the history observed in the Great Recession, a positive shock to
government spending equal to 2% has bigger dollar-for-dollar effects than a shock equal to
1% of GDP. The 2% shock increases output by $1.9, whereas the smaller shock increases
output by $1.6. This difference is significant during the second year, and significant during
the first 3 years if we consider 68% credibility intervals. Since the responses are scaled to
account for the difference in size, this means that a single larger spending shocks would
increase output more than a sequence of smaller spending shocks that add up to the value
of the large shock. To the extent that the cost of the fiscal stimulus is proportional to
the size of the shock (for example, because the public debt created depends on the size
of the shock) this result implies that it is better to implement fiscal stimulus all at once
rathen than piecemeal over time. 27
Spending cuts have larger effects than increases when capacity is far below the threshold
value. As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 23, a cut decreases output by $2, a stimulus
increases output by $1.6, and this difference is significant during the first 12 quarters.
The sign asymmetry indirectly confirms the state-dependence found in FMP1. Following
a stimulus, output and capacity increase, eventually getting closer to the constrained
state, which dampens the size of the multiplier. But a decrease in spending decreases
output, pushing capacity further below the threshold, leading to an output response that
is very similar in shape and size to the fixed-regime responses presented in FMP1. The
significance of the size asymmetry also implies that unless a cut is deliberately offset by
27Of course, there could be benefits of a sequence of small shocks relative to a single large shock that are
not captured in our model. For example, there may be uncertainty about how much total stimulus
to inject that may be partially resolved by waiting for the economy to evolve.
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an alternative measure (either fiscal or monetary), it would lead to a disproportionate
decrease in output if implemented during a deep recession.
When the economy is closer to the limits imposed by resource constraints (in the
late 1990s), the asymmetries look different. Beginning from a state of high capacity
utilization, the effect of a large spending shock is proportionally less than the effect of a
small shock (the modal peak responses are 0.9 vs 1.2) . Again, this finding confirms the
interpretation of the basic state-dependence results from FMP1. A large stimulus would
push the economy towards full employment faster, and the converted dollar-for-dollar
response is very close to the dollar-for-dollar fixed regime response.
Furthermore, cuts have smaller effects during periods of high capacity utilization. A
cut in government spending decreases output by $0.4 in the long run, implying that when
the economy is doing fairly well, a spending cut is not likely to push it down in a recession.
The sign asymmetry implies that while cuts do decrease output, the timing when they
are implemented matters, and it is possible to minimize the negative impact of cuts.
The history-dependent sign and size asymmetries both confirm the results from FMP1
that the effects of government spending on output are larger and more persistent when ca-
pacity utilization is low, and confirm the economic intuition behind the state-dependence.
In the following subsections, I examine the source of this result about the asymmetric
response of output to fiscal policy shocks in more detail. In particular, I look at the
responses of consumption and investment, and at the responses of employment.
3.4.3. Consumption and Investment: Size and Sign Asymmetry within a State
Figures 25 through 28 display the response of consumption of nondurables and services
and of fixed plus nonresidential investment to a government spending shock.28 Consump-
tion increases both in the constrained and in the unconstrained state, but the magnitude
of the response is different. In a rapid growth phase like the mid-late 1990s, a $1 increase
28I use consumption of nondurables and services and fixed plus nonresidential investment so that the
results can be easily compared to the results obtained by Ramey (2012b). The shape of the responses
of consumption and gross invesment is very similar to the results shown in Figures 25 and 26.
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in government spending increases consumption by $0.4, and a $1 increase during a deep
recession increases consumption by $0.9. The difference in the size of the consumption
multiplier is consistent with the state-dependence results.
When starting in a deep recession, a large stimulus increases consumption by $1.1,
compared to the $0.9 increase from a smaller stimulus. Cuts in government spending
decrease consumption, and the response is larger than the response to increases. This
difference is significant during the second year following the stimulus. There is no evi-
dence that expansions crowd out consumption, or that cuts crowd in consumption during
deep recessions. The responses of consumption when starting in a rapid expansion are
very similar, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to the responses of output. Large
increases in government spending have smaller impact, dollar-for-dollar, as do cuts. A
2% increase in spending increases consumption, dollar-for-dollar by $0.15, and a 1% in-
crease in government spending increases consumption by $0.4. A cut initially crowds out
consumption by $0.2, then crowds it in, then crowds it out, with a long run response of
$0.1.
Figures 27 and 28 display the responses of investment. The modal responses are asym-
metric depending on the state of the economy, but this asymmetry is weak and not sta-
tistically significant. When starting in a deep recession, an increase in spending increases
investment during the first year (peak response $0.9), then investment falls slightly below
zero only to rise again to a long run response after 5 years of $0.7, but the response is not
significant. A cut in spending decreases investment, but there is also no evidence that
this decrease is significant, nor that there is significant sign asymmetry. Similarly, there
appears to be no difference in the responses of investment to large and small spending
shocks. When the economy starts above the threshold (i.e. in a rapid expansion), invest-
ment is crowded out. Furthermore, a cut initially crowds in investment, then crowds it
out. Even though the difference in the responses of investment is not statistically signifi-
cant, it is important to note that both the shape of the impulse response and the difference
in responses both for consumption and for investment are quite similar in shape and mag-
nitude to the fixed-regime-response from FMP1, and also very similar in magnitude and
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shape to responses obtained from linear DSGE models.
Overall, the strong state-dependence in the responses of consumption suggest that a
lot of the asymmetry in the response of output is due to different responses of these key
components to government spending depending on the degree of resource utilization.
3.4.4. Employment: Size and Sign Asymmetry within a State
Figures 29 and 30 display the impulse responses of total employment, and Figures 31 and
32 display the responses of private employment. The responses of employment also exhibit
state-dependence. In Figure 29, when the economy is in a deep recession, in response to
a government spending shock equal to 1% employment increases by 1 percent after two
years, and the long run response is equal to 0.8 percent. In response to a spending shock
equal to 2% of GDP, employment increases by 2.6% (meaning that the jobs-per-dollar
increase is larger for a larger spending shock). The size asymmetry is significant during
the first two years. A spending cut decreases employment by 1.6%, and the difference in
the size of the responses between a cut and a stimulus is significant in the second year
following the spending shock.
When the economy starts in a high-utilization state, the effect of a government spending
shock on employment is only slightly positive and transitory. The credibility intervals for
employment, however, are quite wide, and zero effects are not outside the 90% interval for
either regime. There is no evidence of size and sign asymmetry, and there is no evidence
that cuts decrease employment in the high utilization state. The state dependence and
the size and sign asymmetry imply that when there are underutilized physical resources
in the economy, there is also a large degree of underutilized labor resources, and spending
increases increase employment. Furthermore, the fact that the response to a cut in the
low state is larger than the response to an increase confirms the state-dependence results.
Ramey (2012) uses a linear model where the military spending variable is ordered
first, and she argues that most of the increase in employment comes from the increase
in government employment, with the response of private employment being negligible.
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In order to examine if the negligible response of private employment is driven by state-
dependence, I also look at the responses of private employment across states. Figures 11
and 12 display the responses of private employment.
The response of private employment to a 1% spending shock in the low state is large
and positive, peaking at 1.2%, and leveling off after 2 years. The cumulative response
after 5 years in the late 1990s is weakly negative, and not significantly different from
zero, indicating that the responses of private employment are also state-dependent. The
response to a 2% spending shock is 1%, making the jobs-per-dollar effect smaller for a
larger stimulus. A 1% cut in the low state decreases private employment by 0.8. In
the high state, a large spending increase decreases employment by 0.5. It is interesting
to note that a cut also decreases employment by 0.2% after 5 years. The results for
private employment indicate that the state-dependent response of employment is not
driven by the government sector. Also, the fact that in the high state a cut decreases
employment, and a large increase in spending decreases employment more than a smaller
increase, indicates that there are trade-offs in the high state. The full-employment state
determined by the model corresponds closely to the definition of “full-employment” from
Neoclassical models. A cut decreases private employment in the unconstrained state, and
a large increase increases employment less than a smaller increase, but the scaled response
to a large shock is still significant at all horizons, which stands in contrast to Ramey’s
(2012) results. This indicates that while there are trade-offs in the unconstrained state,
they are much smaller than in the constrained state.
3.4.5. Cuts during a Weak Recovery
In the previous subsections I examined the responses of output, output components and
labor market variables in extreme states- a deep recession, and a rapid expansion. As
discussed in the previous subsections, if the goal is to make inferences about asymmetries
in the relationship between government spending and the private sector, it is natural to
look at the extreme cases when we are fairly certain that there is a significant degree of
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underutilization, or when the capacity constraints are close to binding. Similarly, if one
wanted to make inference about implementing a certain policy, a stimulus is most likely
to be implemented during a deep recession, and cuts are most likely to be implemented
during a rapid expansion. While the extreme cases are very important, both because of
their theoretical importance and because of the importance for policy, in 2010 through
early 2013 the U.S. economy has presented a case study that does not fall into either
category. The recovery following the recession has been slow and drawn out, and the
U.S. government cut spending during a weak recovery.
While evaluating the full spectrum of policies undertaken in the period following the
Great Recession would entail a much more detailed model that takes into account the
individual cuts and the individual tax increases, the model used here can help us develop
an intuition about the optimal time to implement austerity measures, and it can help us
evaluate what kinds of effects spending cuts are likely to have during a weak recovery.
Figure 33 shows the response to an increase in government spending equal to 1% of GDP,
and to a decrease in government spending equal to 1% in GDP when the economy starts
out in 2012Q3 (the last observation in the sample). Positive fiscal stimulus increases out-
put by $1.5 (dollar-for-dollar), and this increase is significant the first two years following
the shock. A cut decreases output by $1.8, and the negative impact does not die out even
after five years. This indicates that responses during a weak recovery are much more
similar to responses during recessions than to responses during rapid expansions.
3.5. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have presented strong empirical evidence in favor of state-dependent
effects of fiscal policy and in favor of size and sign asymmetries. In particular, I use an
impulse response based comparison to confirm the state-dependence found by Fazzari,
Morley, and Panovska (2013). I find that a rise in demand from the government sector
causes large and persistently positive effects on output when the economy is operating
with relatively low capacity utilization. This effect is much smaller and less persistent
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when capacity utilization is above an estimated threshold for the model. There is no
evidence that higher government spending crowds out consumption. Indeed, consump-
tion rises after positive government spending shocks in both the high- and low-utilization
regimes, but the increase is almost twice as large during “normal” times (i.e., low uti-
lization) than during “booms” (i.e., high utilization). Both total payroll employment and
private employment also exhibit strong state-dependence.
When the economy is not resource constrained, a large fiscal stimulus is more effective
at increasing employment and output. In contrast, when the economy is close to ca-
pacity, a large stimulus has smaller effects on output than a smaller stimulus, consistent
with the view that our results arise from traditional demand channel, but constrained
when resources are limited . Consumption exhibits the same asymmetric responses as
output. A cut crowds in investment more than an expansion crowds out investment in
the high-utilization state. Investment rises in the unconstrained state, but the response
not significant, and there is no significant evidence of sign or size asymmetry. When the
economy is very close to capacity, fiscal cuts have larger effects on payroll employment
than fiscal expansions. The effects on private employment are smaller in magnitude, but
qualitatively similar to the effects of cuts and expansions on overall employment. The
size and sign asymmetry imply that when there are underutilized physical resources in
the economy, there is also a large degree of underutilized labor resources, and spending
increases increase employment.
The state-dependence of the multipliers, and the sign and size asymmetries within
a state indicate that both the timing, and the size of stimulus and austerity measures
matters, and should be taken into account when designing policy. Further extensions of
this work will explore policy implications more deeply. In particular, I plan to explore
the effects of higher government spending on the dynamics of government debt in more
detail.
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A. Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1. State-Space Representation for the Unobserved Components
Model
The measurement equation for the model given by equations (1)-(11) is

yt
st
et
ht

=

1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

∗ βt (18)
βt = [τt κt cyt cyt−1 cst cst−1 cet cet−1 cht cht−1] and the transition equation is given by
βt = µt + Fβt−1 + ut (19)
where µ = [µ1 µ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 µ3 0]
′ and ut = [ηt vt uyt 0 ust 0 uet 0 uht 0]′ where
uxt is the linear combination of structural shocks corresponding to the right-hand of the
equation that defines behavior of the cyclical component of variable x, given by equations
(8)-(11). The transition matrix F is given by
F =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 φy1 φy2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 φs1 φs2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 φe1 φe2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 φh1 φh2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

. (20)
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When hours per capita are assumed to have a time-varying mean, the measurement
equation for the estimated model is given by

yt
st
et
ht

=

1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

∗ βt (21)
where βt = [τt κt µht cyt cyt−1 cst cst−1 cet cet−1 cht cht−1] and the transition equation is
given by
βt = µ+ Fβt−1 + ut (22)
where µ = [µ1 µ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
′ and ut = [ηt vt ht uyt 0 ust 0 uet 0 uht 0]′ where
uxt is the linear combination of structural shocks corresponding to the right-hand of the
equation that defines behavior of the cyclical component of variable x, given by equations
(8)-(11). The transition matrix F is given by
F =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 φy1 φy2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 φs1 φs2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 φe1 φe2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 φh1 φh2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

. (23)
The state-space representation is identical for each subsample. The variance-covariance
matrix Q is equal to E[utu
′
t]. For the sake of brevity, the equations that describe each
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element of Q as a function of the variances of the structural shocks and the impact
coefficients is omitted, but it is available upon request from the author.
Model and State-Space Representation for Services
Since the services sector does not typically hold physical inventories (at least at the
quarterly level), the model is adjusted to reflect that output and sales are equal within a
quarter. The new model is given by the following equations:
yt = τt + cy (24)
et = ζt + ce (25)
ht = µ+ ch (26)
where yt is hundred times the logarithm of real GDP, et is hundred times the logarithm
of employment, and ht is the logarithm of aggregate hours per employee. The stochastic
trends in employment and output and the permanent shocks have the same interpretation
as in the baseline model. The cyclical components are assumed to be stationary, and their
dynamics can be described by the following equations:
Φ1(L)(yt − τt) = λyτηt + y. (27)
Φ3(L)(et − τt − κt) = λeτηt + λeyy + e (28)
Φ4(L)(ht − µ3) = λhτηt + λhyy + λhee + h (29)
where the impact coefficients are also defined as in the baseline model.
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The state-space representation for the trivariate model is given by:

yt
et
ht
 =

1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 ∗ βt (30)
βt = [τt κt cyt cyt−1 cet cet−1 cht cht−1] and the transition equation is given by
βt = µ+ Fβt−1 + ut (31)
where µ = [µ1 µ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
′ and ut = [ηt vt uyt 0 uet 0 uht 0]′ where uxt is the linear
combination of structural shocks corresponding to the right-hand of the equation that
defines behavior of the cyclical component of variable x, given by equations (21)-(23).
The transition matrix F is given by
F =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 φy1 φy2 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 φe1 φe2 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 φh1 φh2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

. (32)
A.2. Cointegration
Figure 8 illustrates the motivation for modeling output and sales as cointegrated series.
Both output and sales are nonstationary, which can be easily confirmed by pre-testing
using standard unit root or stationarity tests. Both the first differences and the series are
stationary. Indeed, as shown in Table 9, I reject the null of no cointegration if I assume
that the cointegrating vector is [1 − 1].
Estimating the cointegrating vector leads to estimates that are very close to [1 − 1],
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and again I reject the null of no cointegration, implying that output and sales share the
same stochastic trend.
A.3. Bayesian Estimation
The results presented in the text are obtained using a multi-block Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm with a tailored proposal distribution. In order to ensure identification, I restrict
the sign of λyη and λsη. Assuming that λyη and λsη < 0 is fairly innocuous in this context
and is in line with previous studies, as discussed below. For convenience, the prior for λyη
and λsη were truncated normal distributions on (−∞, 0) with mean −0.5 and variance
equal to 1, and the prior for λys was a truncated normal distribution on (0,∞) with
mean 1 and variance 1. These priors are based on the MLE estimates and on results of
previous studies (for example, Morley et al., 2003, Sinclair 2009, Morley and Singh, 2012,
or Basistha, 2009). Restricting λys to be positive simply means that output responds
positively to positive sales shocks. This restriction is based on the MLE estimates and is
consistent both with theory and with estimated responses from a baseline VECM model.
It is important to note that the truncated priors are merely a convenient tool to ensure
slightly faster convergence- the results were robust to the choice of priors, and using more
diffuse priors or different families of priors does not affect the results significantly. The
only restriction that is needed to identify the coefficients is the sign restrictions.
The priors for the initial values for the stochastic trends were Gaussian distributions
that were centered at the initial observations and had variance equal to 10. The MH
algorithm was implemented as follows:
1. Start with arbitrary values for the parameter coefficients.
2. Conditional on the parameter coefficients, obtain the smoothed estimates for the
state variables.
3. At the ith iteration, conditional on the parameter vector θ(i) and the state variables,
draw a new value for the J-dimensional parameter block θb from a Student-t proposal
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with mean θ
(i)
b , scale equal to the J-by-J subblock of the inverse of the Hessian
matrix evaluated at θ(i) and 15 degrees of freedom. If the value is accepted, update
θi to reflect the update when calculating the Hessian for the other blocks.
4. Repeat step 2 until all parameters are updated, update θi+1
The results presented in the text were obtained using 80,000 iterations of the MH chain,
after a burn-in of 20,000 draws. To ensure convergence, the chain was started from several
different values.In order to obtain the trend and cycle estimates, I use the Kalman filter
and the related prediction-error decomposition.
A.4. Tables
Table 1: Mean and standard deviations of growth rates by subsample
Average Recoveries
1948Q1- 1983Q4 1984q1-2012Q1 1948Q1- 1983Q4 1984q1-2012Q1
Output
0.87
(1.13)
0.67
(0.64)
1.60
(0.81)
0.65
(0.31)
Sales
0.87
(0.89)
0.67
(0.60)
1.17
(0.54)
0.37
(0.46)
Employment
0.50
(0.79)
0.33
(0.49)
0.70
(0.49)
−0.14
(0.31)
Aggregate Hours
0.40
(1.42)
0.29
(0.62)
1.01
(1.00)
−0.05
(0.47)
Hours per Employee
−0.10
(0.74)
−0.03
(0.26)
0.31
(0.61)
0.08
(0.25)
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Table 2: Posterior medians for key parameters (standard deviations in parentheses)
1948q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q4 Change in Parameter
φ11 + φ12 0.45(0.11) 0.62 (0.16) 0.16 (0.13)
φ21 + φ22 0.66 (0.15) 0.59 (0.11) -0.06 (0.09)
φ31 + φ33 0.60 (0.12) 0.69 (0.18) 0.10 (0.25)
φ41 + φ42 0.85 (0.17) 0.89 (0.18) 0.05 (0.20)
ση 1.72 (0.22) 1.29 (0.02) -0.42 (0.21)
σy 0.49 (0.14) 0.28 (0.03) -0.21 (0.09)
σs 0.34 (0.10) 0.29 (0.08) -0.06 (0.11)
σe 0.21 (0.09) 0.12 (0.01) -0.10 (0.05)
σh 0.53 (0.09) 0.24 (0.09) -0.30 (0.18)
λeη -0.14 (0.08) -0.22 (0.01) -0.08 (0.06)
λhη -0.18 (0.04) -0.25 (0.02) -0.07 (0.05)
λes 0.35 (0.06) 0.87 (0.03) 0.52 (0.07)
λhs 0.27 (0.17) 0.22 (0.07) 0.06 (0.05)
λey 0.11 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) -0.05 (0.02)
λhy 0.20 (0.02) 0.33 (0.02) 0.14 (0.07)
λhe 0.68 (0.21) -0.13 (0.11) -0.81 (0.16)
Table 3: Volatility and impact coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses)
1948q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q4 1984q1-2007q3
ση 1.716 (0.221) 1.288 (0.105) 0.914 (0.101)
σv 0.741 (0.144) 0.739 (0.051) 0.678 (0.153)
σy 0.491 (0.141) 0.282 (0.029) 0.196 (0.072)
σs 0.338 (0.092) 0.287 (0.083) 0.250 (0.132)
σe 0.210 (0.082) 0.119 (0.009) 0.090 (0.020)
σh 0.527 (0.092) 0.239 (0.092) 0.223 (0.025)
ρην -0.752 (0.130) -0.689 (0.125) -0.835 (0.141)
λyη -0.785 (0.120) -0.720 (0.075) -0.773 (0.098)
λsη -0.834 (0.152) -0.717(0.082) -0.768 (0.112)
λeη -0.136 (0.081) -0.221 (0.014) -0.218 (0.099)
λhη -0.184 (0.036) -0.254 (0.015) -0.235 (0.052)
λys 0.325 (0.027) 0.257 (0.095) 0.645 (0.152)
λes 0.349 (0.061) 0.872 (0.028) 0.783 (0.114)
λhs 0.269 (0.167) 0.218 (0.072) 0.242 (0.098)
λey 0.113 (0.007) 0.059 (0.006) 0.211 (0.054)
λhy 0.198 (0.017) 0.326 (0.022) 0.321 (0.093)
λhe 0.683 (0.214) -0.126 (0.112) -0.150 (0.055)
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Table 4: Sums of the estimated AR coefficients: Manufacturing (standard deviations in
parentheses)
Total Manufacturing Durables Nondurables
1964q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q2 1964q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q2 1964q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q2
φy1 + φy2 0.788 (0.120) 0.777 (0.045) 0.851 (0.137) 0.647 (0.081) 0.746 (0.217) 0.628 (0.087)
φs1 + φs2 0.811 (0.024) 0.774 (0.132) 0.739 (0.057) 0.660 (0.078) 0.814 (0.132) 0.724 (0.092)
φe1 + φe2 0.896 (0.012) 0.895 (0.120) 0.912 (0.019) 0.748 (0.170) 0.901 (0.093) 0.897 (0.074)
φh1 + φh2 0.781 (0.114) 0.899 (0.120) 0.804 (0.117) 0.899 (0.182) 0.853 (0.098) 0.827 (0.105)
Table 5: Estimated variances and impact coefficients: Manufacturing (standard devia-
tions in parentheses)
Manufacturing- aggregate Durables Nondurables
1964q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q2 1964q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q2 1964q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q2
ση 6.369 (0.323) 1.344 (0.182) 3.595 (0.324) 1.432 (0.235) 2.302 (0.253) 1.439 (0.128)
σv 6.263 (2.257) 2.512 (0.619) 3.411 (0.521) 3.042 (0.133) 2.218 (0.416) 1.868 (0.425)
σy 1.821 (0.421) 0.834 (0.594) 2.669 (0.262) 1.103 (0.235) 1.480 (0.209) 1.181 (0.056)
σs 1.505 (0.122) 0.796 (0.082) 2.339 (0.116) 1.182 (0.210) 1.101 (0.210) 0.984 (0.112)
σe 0.801 (0.126) 1.055 (0.221) 0.953 (0.313) 0.454 (0.128) 0.512 (0.043) 0.376 (0.42)
σh 0.617 (0.111) 0.414 (0.062) 0.706 (0.073) 0.502 (0.027) 0.841 (0.117) 0.382 (0.057)
ρην -0.798 (0.211) -0.687 (0.233) -0.693 (0.078) -0.621 (0.221) -0.855 (0.025) -0.532 (0.115)
λyη -0.731 (0.124) -0.827 (0.065) -0.998 (0.026) -0.557 (0.080) -0.636 (0.149) -0.481 (0.117)
λsη -0.678 (0.012) -0.657 (0.032) -0.651 (0.183) -0.759 (0.012) -0.786 (0.062) -0.930 (0.042)
λeη -0.217 (0.042) -0.238 (0.051) -0.262 (0.082) -0.198 (0.023) -0.166 (0.024) -0.188 (0.050)
λhη -0.265 (0.010) -0.117 (0.013) -0.279 (0.110) -0.084 (0.052) -0.127 (0.120) -0.214 (0.162)
λys 0.899 (0.014) 0.771 (0.079) 0.668 (0.160) 0.763 (0.133) 0.396 (0.025) 0.768 (0.104)
λes 0.159 (0.011) 0.653 (0.068) 0.04 (0.267) 0.232 (0.056) 0.450 (0.063) 1.811 (0.222)
λhs 0.210 (0.320) 0.228 (0.117) 0.123 (0.073) 0.218 (0.155) 0.261 (0.052) 0.221 (0.083)
λey 0.167 (0.025) 0.101 (0.131) 0.358 (0.282) 0.087 (0.102) 0.728 (0.054) 0.219 (0.052)
λhy 0.221 (0.104) 0.259 (0.014) 0.394 (0.034) 0.418 (0.145) 0.450 (0.051) 0.590 (0.021)
λhe 0.158 (0.041) -0.302 (0.174) -0.104 (0.234) -0.257 (0.066) 0.034 (0.100) -0.326 (0.071)
Table 6: Sums of the estimated AR coefficients: Services and FIRE (standard deviations
in parentheses)
Services FIRE
1964q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q2 1964q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q2
φy1 + φy2 0.700 (0.118) 0.801 (0.199) 0.953 (0.069) 0.843 (0.164)
φe1 + φe2 0.782 (0.155) 0.889 (0.073) 0.836 (0.087) 0.987 (0.018)
φh1 + φh2 0.902 (0.058) 0.862 (0.099) 0.873 (0.143) 0.755 (0.156)
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Table 7: Estimated variances and impact coefficients: services and FIRE (standard devi-
ations in parentheses)
Services FIRE
1964q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q2 1964q1-1983q4 1984q1-2011q2
ση 1.243 (0.156) 1.217 (0.234) 2.451 (0.021) 2.136 (0.354)
σv 2.073 (0.560) 3.487 (0.412) 1.893 (0.245) 1.831 (0.052)
σy 1.688 (0.043) 1.253 (0.229) 1.584 (0.098) 0.978 (0.137)
σe 0.798 (0.062) 0.906 (0.305) 0.678 (0.125) 0.304 (0.061)
σh 0.204 (0.052) 0.309 (0.140) 0.706 (0.073) 1.038 (0.119)
ρην -0.750 (0.300) -0.319 (0.210) -0.836 (0.144) -0.362 (0.115)
λyη -0.869 (0.128) -0.958 (0.062) -0.552 (0.166) -0.725 (0.215)
λeη -0.0473 (0.102) -0.185 (0.158) -0.137 (0.096) -0.115(0.087)
λhη -0.176 (0.113) -0.241 (0.052) -0.034 (0.007) -0.165 (0.058)
λey 0.379 (0.005) 0.121 (0.014) 0.363 (0.125) 0.067 (0.032)
λhy 0.286 (0.041) 0.450 (0.056) 0.343 (0.006) 0.449 (0.095)
λhe 0.278 (0.102) -0.048 (0.031) 0.321 (0.064) -0.165 (0.005)
Table 8: Priors for the Bayesian Estimation (UC Model)
Family Mean Variance
(φi1 φi2) Truncated Normal, to ensure stationarity (0 0) I2
σ2X Inverse Gamma 1 5
λyτ Truncated Normal -0.5 1
λsτ Truncated Normal -0.5 1
λys Truncated Normal 1 1
λi,,ji6=y,s Normal 0 10
µ1,2
29 Normal 0 10
Table 9: Testing for Cointegration Between Output and Sales
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficient on Sales ADF, Residual Series
OLS −1.0004 (0.0006) -7.953 (<0.001)
Imposing [1 − 1] as cointegrating vector - -8.08 (<0.001)
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A.5. Figures
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Figure 1: Behavior of payroll employment the 12 quarters following the NBER trough
(1=Level at the NBER Peak)
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Figure 2: Decomposition of the path of employment by type of shock
Notes: Left panel: observed path of log employment (blue) versus movements causes by
permanent shocks (red) and movements caused by purely transitory shocks (green). The
right panel plots the decomposition of the cyclical part of employment: fluctuations due
to sales shocks (dashed green line) and fluctuations due to non-sales output shocks.NBER
recessions are shaded in gray, the blue shading indicates the four quarters following the NBER
trough.
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Figure 3: Decomposition of the path of mean-adjusted hours per employee by type of
shock
Notes: Observed path of mean adjusted hours per employee (blue line) versus movements
causes by permanent shocks (dashed red line), movements caused by purely transitory sales
shocks (patterned black line), and movements caused by transitory non-sales output shocks
(dashed green line).
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Figure 4: Counterfactual paths for employment.
Notes: Observed path of log employment (blue line), 90% credibility interval for the counter-
factual path of employment when the sensitivity coefficient λes is drawn from the pre-1984
posterior distribution (green), and 90% credibility interval for the counterfactual path of em-
ployment when the sensitivity coefficient λey is drawn from the pre-1984 posterior distribution
(red).
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Figure 5: Counterfactual paths for hours per employee (mean-adjusted)
Notes: Observed path of mean-adjusted hours per employee (blue line), 90% credibility in-
terval for the counterfactual path of mean-adjusted hours per employee when the sensitivity
coefficient λhs is drawn from the pre-1984 posterior distribution (green), and 90% credibil-
ity interval for the counterfactual path of employment when the sensitivity coefficient λhy is
drawn from the pre-1984 posterior distribution (red).
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Figure 6: Employment in the manufacturing sector after the NBER trough(1=Level at
the NBER Peak)
Notes: Left: total manufacturing, middle: durables, right: nondurables. Blue: average be-
fore 1984, red:recovery from 1990 recession, green: recovery from the 2001 recession, black:
recovery from the Great Recession. Observed path of log employment (blue line), 90% credi-
bility interval for the counterfactual path of employment when the sensitivity coefficient λes
is drawn from the pre-1984 posterior distribution (green), and 90% credibility interval for
the counterfactual path of employment when the sensitivity coefficient λey is drawn from the
pre-1984 posterior distribution (red).
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Figure 7: Employment in the services and FIRE sector after the NBER trough(1=Level
at the NBER Peak).
Notes: Left: service, right: FIRE. Blue: average before 1984, red:recovery from 1990 reces-
sion, green: recovery from the 2001 recession, black: recovery from the Great Recession.
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Figure 8: Cointegration: real GDP and real sales. Left: Real GDP (blue), real final sales
(red). Right: d = y − s. The sample size is 1948q1:2012Q1.
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B. Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1. Bayesian Estimation
For the baseline linear model, I assume that the prior for the VAR parameters is mul-
tivariate normal, the prior for the variance matrix is an inverse Wishart distribution, and
the prior for the scale parameter λ is a Gamma distribution. Under these assumptions, I
can sample directly using a Gibbs step. Specifically, recall that the linear model is given
by (1):
Yt = Φ0 + Φ(L)Yt−1 + λtεt
where Φ(L) is an autoregressive matrix polynomial with roots strictly outside the unit
circle, t = 1 for t = 1967q1,...,1983q4 and equal to λ for t = 1984q1,... 2010q4, and
εt is iid Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and variance- covariance matrix Ω that
does not change over time. Then, letting Φ = vec(Φ0)|vec(Φ1)...|vec(Φj), I assume that
the prior for Φ is a normal distribution, truncated to the stationarity region, with mean
equal to 0, and variance-covariance matrix equal to Vn. The scaling parameter λ is
assumed to have a gamma prior with parameters α and β, and I impose an inverted
Wishart prior with v0 = 25 degrees of freedom and a scale matrix R0. For brevity, let
rhst = [1 yt−1,1 . . . yt−1,k . . . yt−p,k] and
xt =

rhst 0 0 0
0 rhst 0 0
0 0 rhst 0
0 0 0 rhst

.
It is straightforward to see that Φ|Ω, λ, y is Gaussian with variance
V = (V −1n +
T∑
t=p+1
x
′
t(λtΩ)
−1xt)−1
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and mean
µ = V −1(
T∑
t=p+1
x
′
t(λtΩ)
−1yt).
Similarly, Ω|Φ, λ, y ∼ IW (ν1, R1), where ν1 = ν0 + T − 4 and R1 = [R−10 +
∑T
t=5(yt −
xtΦ)
′λ−1t (yt − xtΦ)]−1. The inverse Wishart distribution is a standard distribution, so I
can sample Ω conditional on the other parameters directly. Conditional on the other
parameters and the data, λ has a gamma distribution with parameters α1 = α + Tp and
β1 = β+0.5
∑T
t=t1
(yt−xtΦ)′Ω−1(yt−xtΦ) where t1 = 1984Q1, and Tp = 108 (the number
of quarters from 1984Q1 to 2010Q4).
The threshold model is given by
Yt = Φ
1
0 + Φ1(L)Yt−1 + (Φ
2
0 + Φ2(L)Yt−1)I[qt ≤ γ] + λtεt
where qt is the threshold variable, γ is the threshold around which the dynamics of
the model changes, and the other variables are defined similarly to the variables in the
linear model. Let rhs1t = [rhst rsht ∗ I[qt ≤ γ] and assume that the prior for Φ =
vec(Φ10)|vec(Φ1)|vec(Φ02)|vec(Φ2) is normal with mean 0 and variance 0, truncated so
that Φ1(L) and Φ˜(L) = Φ1(L) + Φ2(L) have roots strictly outside the unit circle (i.e. so
that the VAR is stationary in each regime).
Similar to the linear case, it is straightforward to show that Φ|Ω, λ, γ, y is Gaussian with
variance V = (V −1n +
∑T
t=p+1 x
′
1t(λtΩ)
−1x1t)−1and mean µ = V −1(
∑T
t=p+1 x
′
1t(λtΩ)
−1yt),
where x1t is defined the same way as xt,except I use the vector rhs1t is used in place of
rhst. Likewise, the conditional distribution of Ω is inverse Wishart, and the conditional
posterior distribution of λ is gamma, and I can sample from these posteriors using a
Gibbs step. The conditional distribution for γ is nonstandard, and it has to be sampled
using an MH step.
Following the standard approach in the literature, the proposal density is Student−t
with 15 degrees of freedom. To obtain the mode for the proposal distribution for the first
draw, I use concentrated maximum likelihood and grid search over the middle 70% of the
threshold variable in order to obtain the posterior mode of the parameter γ. Because εt
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is assumed to be Gaussian, the ML estimators can be obtained by using least squares
estimation. For this maximization γ is restricted to a bounded set Γ = [γ, γ] that covered
the middle 70% of the threshold variable.
Conditional on γ and the threshold variable, the model is linear in Φ and Ω. Estimat-
ing the linear model by splitting the sample into two subsamples yields the conditional
estimators Φ̂ and Ω̂. The estimated threshold value (conditional on the threshold variable
and the delay lag) can be identified uniquely as
γ̂ = arg max
γ∈Γn
llikn(γ|q, d) (33)
where Γ is approximated by a grid search on Γn = Γ∩{q1, q2, ..., qn}. To ensure identifica-
tion, the bottom and top 15% quantiles of the threshold variable are trimmed. I use the
estimated value γ̂ for constructing the proposal for the first draw of the MH algorithm.
Given a sufficiently large burn-in, the value of γˆ does not affect the Bayesian estimates,
but it provides us with a plausible starting value for the mode and it enables us to easily
compare the Bayesian mode with the maximum likelihood estimate.
Note, however, that the grid search makes it infeasible to obtain the variance of the
estimate of γ. To address this issue, I use the approach proposed by Lo and Morley
(2013). In particular, I obtain a measure of the curvature of the posterior with respect to
γ by inverting the likelihood ratio statistics for the threshold parameters, based on the
assumption that the parameter estimate is normally distributed and the LR statistics is
χ2(1). I use the 95% CI for the likelihood ratio statistics to obtain a corresponding stan-
dard error for γ. Again, I do not attempt to perform frequentist inference. This is simply
a fast way of obtaining a plausible value for the curvature. It it important to note that
this approach is only an approximation, and it not asymptotically accurate for obtaining
standard errors of the ML estimate for γ, but it is much faster than bootstrapping and
inverting the LR test in order to obtain the scale for the first draw of the MH algorithm.
Because this approximation affects only the first draw, it will not affect the estimates of
the parameters if the burn-in is large enough.
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At the ith iteration, the transition density for γ(i+1) is a Student-t distribution with
mean equal to γ(i) and variance equal to κσˆ2γ, where σˆ
2
γ is obtained by inverting the LR
test. The parameter κ is calibrated on the fly to ensure acceptance rate between 20 and
60%.
To ensure that the results are robust to the choice of priors, the model is estimated by
using different hyperparameters for the priors, and by using different functional forms for
the priors (when the priors are not conjugate to the posteriors, all parameters are drawn
using a multi-block MH step). Also, to check for convergence for each combination of
priors, I start the algorithm from different points, and we use a large burn-in for all
runs of the MH algorithm. In particular, I use a burn-in sample of 20,000 draws and
make inference based on an additional 50,000 MH iterations The results presented and
discussed in the paper are based on the following priors:
Type of Prior Mean Variance/ Scale
Φ Multivariate Gaussian 0 100 ∗ Ik
Ω Inverse Wishart

1 0 0 0
0 4 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

25 ∗ µ
λ Gamma 1 0.75
γ Uniform 0.165 0.3652
B.2. Generalized Impulse Response Function
The procedure for computing the generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) fol-
lows Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996). The generalized impulse response is defined as
the effect of a one-time shock on the forecast of variables in the model, and the response
is compared against a baseline “no shock” scenario.
104
GIRFy(k, εt,Ψt−1) = E[Yt+k|εt,Ψt−1]− E[Yt+k|Ψt−1] (34)
where k is the forecasting horizon, εt is the shock, and Ψt−1 are the initial values of the
variables in the model. The impulse response is then computed by simulating the model.
The shock to government spending is normalized to be equal to 1% of GDP (at the time
the shock occurs).
The GIRFy response for a given draw Θ
(i) of the MH algorithm is generated using the
following steps:
1. Pick a history Ψt−1. The history is the actual value of the lagged endogenous
variable at a particular date.
2. Pick a sequence of 4-dimensional shocks εt+k, k = 0, 1, ..., 20. The shocks are
simulated assuming an independent Gaussian process with mean zero and variance-
covariance matrix equal to λ
(i)
t ∗ Ω(i).
3. Using Ψrt−1 and εt+k, simulate the evolution of Yt+k over l + 1 periods. Denote the
resulting path Yt+k(εi0,Ψt−1, εt+k) for k = 0, 1, ...l.
4. Substitute εi0 for εt+k, using the Cholesky decomposition of Ωt to othogonalize the
shocks. Simulate the evolution of Yt+kover l+ 1 periods. Denote the resulting path
Yt+k(Ψt−1, εt+k) for k = 0, 1, ..., l.
5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 B times, with B = 500 to obtain a consistent estimate of the
impulse response function conditional on the history.
6. To obtain the average response for a subset of histories, repeat steps 1-5 for a the
subset of interest (I compute it for all low states, all high states, the rapid expansion
of the late 1990s and the Great recession), and report the response averaged over
all histories.
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Because the impulse responses are nonlinear functions of the parameters, their distribu-
tion is nonstandard and it is not symmetric around the mean. In cases like this, reporting
the median value is not adequate, as the median may not be a valid measure of central
tendency, and the median impulse response may not correspond to a well-defined struc-
tural model. In order to circumvent this problem, I use the approach proposed by Inoue
and Kilian (2012). For a given history, I evaluate the impulse response function for each
draw of the MH algorithm, drawing the entire impulse response function for periods 1
through 20. Then I average over histories, and evaluate the posterior likelihood of the
impulse response for that draw of the algorithm (averaged over the histories of interest).
The impulse response function with the highest average posterior likelihood is then used
for inference. To construct the (1 − α) ∗ 100% credibility interval, I order the posterior
likelihood values, and include the impulse responses whose posterior likelihood was in
the upper (1 − α) ∗ 100 percentile. This method results in a “credibility cloud” with a
shot gun pattern because we draw entire impulse responses rather than responses for each
individual point in time. For easy interpretation, only the outer points of the cloud are
reported.
B.3. Tables
Table 10: Structural breaks in capacity utilization and unemployment
Break Date(s) F-statistics p-value
cap 1974Q1 41.66 <0.001
un 1974Q3, 1981Q4, 1994Q4 32.34,16.43,6.21 <0.01 ,<0.01,0.03
Notes: The break dates were obtained using a sequential Quandt-Andrews test. The estimated break
dates coincided with the break dates obtained using Bai-Perron’s sequential procedure under the as-
sumption that the mean is the only parameter that has a structural break.
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Table 11: Marginal likelihood values and estimated thresholds: baseline model
Type of Switching Variable qt−d ML Threshold
Linear Model - -997.18 -
Lagged output growth and moving averages of output growth ∆yt−2 -720.69 1.33 (0.12)
Output Gap gapt−1 -682.52 -0.594 (0.41)
Capacity Utilization, not adjusted for breaks (level and growth) capt−1 -800.52 81.1 (1.42)
Capacity Utilization, adjusted for breaks (level and growth) ˆcapt−1 -673.69 -0.21 (0.37)
Unemployment, not adjusted for breaks (level and first differences) unt−1 -703.25 4.83 (0.33)
Unemployment, adjusted for breaks in mean uˆt−2 -760.63 -0.26 (0.11)
Total Federal Debt Held By the Public as % of GDP ratiot−1 -1100.24 34.5 (1.3)
Debt Outstanding, Federal Government Sector, as % of GDP ratio2t−2 -1020.23 47.2 (1.15)
Real Short-Term Interest Rate (FFR-CPI) Rreal,t−2 -1004.42 2.10 (1.35)
Table 12: Marginal likelihoods and likelihood at the mode for the linear model and the
TVAR using ˆcapt−1 as the switching variable
MLLIN likM MLTV AR likm,TV AR
M1 (Y ) -997.18 -1461.28 -673.69 -1338.53
M2 (C) -851.95 -1270.47 -576.91 -1209.77
M3(I) -2011.98 -2561.17 -1473.50 -2216.87
M4 (X) -6414.28 -6962.87 -4060.67 -4812.772
M5 (M) -7011.89 -7519.62 -4311.90 -5062.58
M6 (UR) -813.43 -1205.82 -549.33 -1197.53
M7 (E) -802.77 -1190.28 -544.12 -1199.82
M8 (pi) -1563.58 -2064.27 -1156.22 -1995.35
Table 13: Estimated thresholds when mean-adjusted capacity utilization is the switching
variable
Posterior Mode for γ (Standard Deviation in Parentheses)
M1 (Y ) -0.21 (0.37)
M2 (C) -0.54 (0.37)
M3(I) -1.39 (1.32)
M4 (X) -1.001 (0.12)
M5 (M) -0.177 (0.37)
M6 (UR) -0.461 (0.39)
M7 (E) -0.5133 (0.45)
M8 (pi) -0.521 (0.35)
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B.4. Figures
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Figure 9: Mean-adjusted capacity utilization versus other measures of slack
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Figure 10: Mean-Adjusted Capacity Utilization and Estimated Threshold (with 90% cred-
ibility interval)
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Figure 11: Responses of output to a government spending shock
Left: low initial state, right: high initial state. Top: fixed states, middle: evolving states,
averages over all histories, bottom: evolving states, averages over recent histories (post 1984)
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Figure 12: Responses of government spending to a government spending shock
Left: low initial state, right: high initial state. Top: fixed states, middle: evolving states,
averages over all histories, bottom: evolving states, averages over recent histories (post 1984)
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Figure 13: Responses of tax revenues to a government spending shock
Left: low initial state, right: high initial state. Top: fixed states, middle: evolving states,
averages over all histories, bottom: evolving states, averages over recent histories (post 1984)
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Figure 14: Responses of sonsumption to a government spending shock
Left: low initial state, right: high initial state. Top: fixed states, middle: evolving states,
averages over all histories, bottom: evolving states, averages over recent histories (post 1984)
112
Figure 15: Responses of investment to a government spending shock
Left: low initial state, right: high initial state. Top: fixed states, middle: evolving states,
averages over all histories, bottom: evolving states, averages over recent histories (post 1984)
Figure 16: Fixed-regime responses of exports and imports to a government spending shock
Left: low regime, right: high regime. Top: exports, bottom: imports
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Figure 17: Responses of the unemployment rate to a government spending shock
Left: low initial state, right: high initial state. Top: fixed states, middle: evolving states,
averages over all histories, bottom: evolving states, averages over recent histories (post 1984)
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Figure 18: Responses of employment to a government spending shock
Left: low initial state, right: high initial state. Top: fixed states, middle: evolving states,
averages over all histories, bottom: evolving states, averages over recent histories (post 1984)
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Figure 19: Fixed-regime responses of real interest rates and inflation to a government
spending shock
Left: low initial state, right: high initial state. Top: real interest rate, bottom: inflation.
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Figure 20: Counterfactual output and unemployment rate following the ARRA Stimulus
Notes: Actual Path (solid blue), Median Simulated Counterfactual Path (dashed red).
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C. Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1. Generalized Impulse Response Function Comparison
The procedure for computing the generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) fol-
lows Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996), with the modification of considering an orthogonal
structural shock, as in Kilian and Vigfusson (2011). The generalized impulse response is
defined as the effect of a one-time shock on the forecasted level of variables in the model,
and the response is compared against a baseline “no shock” scenario.
GIRFy(k, shockt,Ψt−1) = α ∗ [E[Yt+k|shockt,Ψt−1]− E[Yt+k|Ψt−1]] (35)
where k is the forecasting horizon, Ψt−1 denotes the initial values of the variables in the
model, and α is the scaling factor, discussed below. The impulse response is then com-
puted by simulating the model. The positive shock to government spending is normalized
to be equal to 1 percent of GDP (at the time the shock occurs), the large positive shock
is normalized to be equal to 2 percent of GDP, and the negative shock is normalized to
be equal to 1 percent of GDP.
The GIRFy response for a given draw Θ
(i) of the MH algorithm is generated using the
following steps:
1. Pick a history Ψt−1. The history is the actual value of the lagged endogenous
variable at a particular date.
2. Pick a sequence of 4-dimensional forecast errors εt+k, k = 0, 1, ..., 20. The forecast
errors are simulated assuming an independent Gaussian process with mean zero and
variance-covariance matrix equal to λ
(i)
t ∗ Ω(i).
3. Using Ψrt−1 and εt+k, simulate the evolution of Yt+k over l + 1 periods. Denote the
resulting path Yt+k(εt+k,Ψt−1) for k = 0, 1, ...l.
4. Using the Cholesky decomposition of Ωt to orthogonalize the shocks, solve for the
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government spending shock at time t, replace it with a shock equal to 1 percent
of GDP, and reconstruct the implied vector of forecast errors. Denote the implied
vector of forecast errors as εshocktt , the sequence of forecast errors as ε
shockt
t+k , and
the resulting simulated evolution of Yt+k over l+ 1 periods as Yt+k(ε
shockt
t+k ,Ψt−1) for
k = 0, 1, ..., l.
5. Construct a draw of a sequence of impulse responses as Yt+k(ε
shockt
t+k ,Ψt−1)−Yt+k(εt+k,Ψt−1)
for k = 0, 1, ..., l.
6. Repeat steps 2 to 5 for B times, with B = 500, and average the sequences of re-
sponses to obtain a consistent estimate of the impulse response function conditional
on the history and the size of the shock.
a) For spending shocks equal to 1% of GDP, I do not rescale the response
b) For large shocks (taken to be equal to 2% of GDP), I rescale the response using
α = 0.5
c) For negative shocks, I rescale the response using α = −1.
7. To obtain the average response for a subset of histories, repeat steps 1-6 for a the
subset of histories of interest, and report the response averaged over all histories.
In the second chapter, the average impulse responses are reported for all low states,
all high states, the rapid expansion of the late 1990s and the Great recession.
8. In order to compare the responses for two types of shocks for a fixed history and,
or the responses for two different histories,i construct the difference
∆IRF = GIRFy(k, shock
1
t ,Ψ
1
t−1)−GIRFy(k, shock2t ,Ψ2t−1).
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Because the impulse responses are nonlinear functions of the parameters, their distribu-
tion of both the generalized impulse responses and the significance ∆IRF is nonstandard
and it is not necessarily symmetric around the mean. In this case, reporting the median
value is unlikely to be adequate, as the median may not be a valid measure of central ten-
dency, and the median impulse response may not correspond to a well-defined structural
model. In order to circumvent this problem, i adapt the approach proposed by Inoue and
Kilian (2012). For a given history, i evaluate the impulse response function for each draw
of the MH algorithm, drawing the entire impulse response function for periods 1 through
20. Then i average over the histories of interest, and i evaluate the posterior likelihood
of the impulse response for that draw of the algorithm. The impulse response function
with the highest average posterior likelihood is then used for inference. To construct the
(1 − α) ∗ 100% credibility interval, i order the posterior likelihood values, and i include
the impulse responses whose posterior likelihood was in the upper (1−α)∗100 percentile.
This method results in a “credibility cloud” with a shot gun pattern because I draw en-
tire impulse responses rather than responses for each individual point in time. For easy
interpretation,I report only the outer points of the cloud. To convert the responses to
dollar-for-dollar or jobs-for-dollar responses, all the impulse responses are converted to
cumulative responses, and then scaled using the ratio Gt/V ariablet for every t.
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C.2. Graphs
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Figure 21: Capacity utilization vs other measures of slack, vertical lines at particular
histories of interest
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Figure 22: Significance: low state vs high state, 90% CI
120
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
1% STIMULUS 2% STIMULUS SCALED
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(1% - 2%) SIGNIFICANCE
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
1% STIMULUS 1% CUT REVERSED
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
STIMULUS VS CUT SIGNIFICANCE
Figure 23: Responses of output to government spending: Great Recession, 90% CI
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Figure 24: Responses of output to government spending: Late 1990s, 90% CI
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Figure 25: Responses of consumption to government spending: Great Recession, 90% CI
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Figure 26: Responses of consumption to government spending: Late 1990s, 90% CI
122
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
1% INCREASE 2% INCREASE
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
1% VS 2% SIGNIFICANCE
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
1% INCREASE 1% CUT
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
1% INCREASE VS 1% CUT
Figure 28: Responses of investment to government Spending: Late 1990s, 90% CI
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Figure 27: Responses of investment to government spending: Great Recession, 90% CI
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Figure 30: Responses of payroll employment to government spending: Late 1990s, 90%
CI
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Figure 29: Responses of Payroll employment to government spending: Great Recession,
90% CI
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Figure 31: Responses of private employment to government spending: Great Recession,
90% CI
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Figure 32: Responses of private employment to government spending: late 1990s, 90% CI
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Figure 33: Responses of output to 1% increase and 1% cut: 2012Q3, 90% CI
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